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Articles
Good Enough Privacyt
Paul Ohm
INTRODUCTION
A decade ago, the National Security Agency ("NSA") declas-
sified two encryption protocols called Skipjack and KEA.' There
was no official ceremony; the event was hardly marked by the
media.2 The protocols quietly slipped out of their secret walled
garden into the unclassified world of public knowledge. It was a
whispered denouement closing one of the most cacophonous, roil-
ing public arguments in the history of technological privacy-the
Clipper Chip debate.
t Copyright © 2008 Paul Olm.
t Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School. Thanks to the editors of
the University of Chicago Legal Forum for inviting me to present and publish this work
and to the attendees of the "Law in a Networked World" symposium for their excellent
comments and questions. Thanks also to Brad Bernthal, Nestor Davidson, Pierre de
Vries, Ed Felten, Scott Moss, and Phil Weiser for their valuable contributions.
1 US DoD to Declassify Skipjack and Kea, Telecomworldwire (June 25, 1998), avail-
able at <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-mOECZ/is_1998_June_25/ai_50104311> (last
visited Apr 3, 2008). KEA stands for the "Key Exchange Algorithm." National Institute of
Standards and Technology, Key Escrow System Glossary, Document number KES-NIST-
SYS-GLSY-U-R1 (Oct 1995), available at <http://csrc.nist.gov/tacdfipsfkmi/KeyEscrow
SystemGlossary.txt> (last visited Apr 3, 2008).
2 The reporting was limited to scientific publications and the trade press. See, for
example, Spooks Show Their Hand, 159 New Scientist 2323 (Jul 4, 1998); NSA Opens
Door for Commercial Fortezza Card Development, 186 Aerospace Daily & Def Rep 61
(June 25, 1998).
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The Clipper Chip-a blanket name describing a bundle of
various technologies-was the United States' response to the fear
that encryption was upsetting the balance between those who
want to speak privately and those who want to listen in. 3 After a
century of relying on wiretaps for gathering evidence of crime
and developing intelligence about threats to national security,
many government entities, and in particular the FBI and NSA,
worried that these capabilities would be lost in a cloud of encryp-
tion.4
The Clipper Chip was touted by its proponents as a way to
use markets rather than government mandates to deal with the
threat of encryption. 5 Rather than ban the use of encryption or
dissemination of encryption tools, the government would encour-
age people to encrypt voice phone calls using a new, robust form
of easy-to-use encryption invented presumably by the NSA. The
catch was that the encryption contained a backdoor, and en-
crypted messages could be unlocked using keys held by the gov-
ernment "in escrow." 6 According to the plans, nobody would be
forced to use Clipper, at least not initially. 7 If people chose to use
it, they would get strong privacy against most of the world in
return for giving up effective privacy against the government.
This Article analyzes the tools that provide or strip privacy
online. Restating it neutrally, it is about tools that provide one of
two opposing values: privacy or transparency.
This Article also seeks to reawaken a slumbering debate. A
decade ago, a fierce argument about Clipper raged. Books were
written,8 computer scientists and industry officials weighed in, 9
3 See Whitfield Diffie and Susan Landau, Privacy on the Line 231-33 (MIT 1998).
4 See id.
5 See A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper
Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U Pa L Rev 709, 742-43 (1995). Some saw it much less
charitably. A. Michael Froomkin, It Came from Planet Clipper: The Battle over Crypto-
graphic Key "Escrow", 1996 U Chi Legal F 15, 67 ("Clipper sought to use government
standard-setting and buying power to rig the market.").
6 See Froomkin, 143 U Pa L Rev at 831 (1995) (cited in note 5). See generally
Froomkin, 1996 U Chi Legal F 15 (cited in note 5).
7 FBI Director Louis Freeh was quoted on more than one occasion keeping open the
possibility of mandated key escrow in the future. See Froomkin, 1996 U Chi Legal F at 66
(cited in note 5) (quoting Director Freeh, "[i]f five years from now... what we are hearing
is all encrypted material that the FBI is unable to decipher, then the policy of relying on
voluntary compliance with (escrowed encryption) will have to change.').
8 See, for example, David Brin, The Transparent Society (Addison-Wesley 1998).
9 See Dorothy Denning, To Tap or Not to Tap, 36 Commun of the Assoc for Comput-
ing Machinery 24 (Mar 1993), plus follow up responses.
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as did legal scholars. 10 Then, the government discovered the peril
of a market-based solution: market rejection. Very few vendors
marketed Clipper Chip-embedded phones, and those that did
sold very few units."
An interesting thing happened next: in a short period of
time, a churning, intense public discussion about the technolo-
gies of privacy and transparency ended abruptly, petering away
almost to nothing. 12 A quiet phase began, and we are still in it.
Three leading online privacy groups maintain web pages about
encryption, yet none have updated these pages since 2001.13
Likewise, the Department of Justice has not modified its cryp-
tography web page since 2000.14 Why did the debate end so sud-
denly? Perhaps the Clipper Chip's rejection was seen as decisive,
regarded by its opponents as unambiguous victory and by its
proponents as complete defeat. Maybe government officials were
simply cowed by the withering criticism and went away to lick
their wounds.
But this is a truce not an armistice. The public debate and
healthy sense of engagement has ended, but the participants
continue to think and talk about privacy and transparency
within their own private communities.
10 See, for example, James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty,
and Hardwired Censors, 66 U Cin L Rev 177, 202-03 (1997); Froomkin, 1996 U Chi Legal
F 15 (cited in note 5); Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 Yale L J 1743 (1995).
The most influential law review discussion of the Clipper Chip was an article by Michael
Froomkin. Froomkin, 143 U Pa L Rev 709 (cited in note 5).
11 Diffie and Landau, Privacy on the Line at 215 (cited in note 3) (citing 17,000 sales
of the AT&T TSD 3600 telephone-which used the Clipper Chip-including 9,000 sales to
the FBI in an attempt to seed the market).
12 The Clinton administration followed Clipper with a few brief proposals, two deri-
sively dubbed Son of Clipper and Clipper III, but none of these were pursued for long.
Froomkin, 1996 U Chi Legal F at 33-34 (cited in note 5) (describing "Son of Clipper"); id
at 50 (describing "Clipper III").
13 Electronic Frontier Foundation, Encryption Archive (last entry dated Jan 13,
2000), available at <http://w2.eff.org/Privacy/Cryptol> (last visited Apr 3, 2008); Center
for Democracy and Technology, Cryptography (last article dated Oct 18, 2001), available
at <http://www.cdt.org/crypto/> (last visited Apr 3, 2008); Electronic Privacy Information
Center, Cryptography Policy (last article dated Oct 17, 2001), available at <http://epic.orgl
crypto/> (last visited Apr 3, 2008).
14 United States Department of Justice, Computer Crime and Intellectual Property
Section, Encryption and Computer Crime (page last updated May 8, 2000), available at
<http://www.usdoj.gov/criminallcybercrime/crypto.html> (last visited Apr 3, 2008). This is
not to say, however, that DOJ is ignoring cryptography. In late 2007, reports surfaced
that DOJ tried to convince a judge to compel a defendant to divulge encryption keys. The
judge ruled against compulsion. See Adam Liptak, If Your Hard Drive Could Testify...,
NY Times A12 (Jan 7, 2008); Declan McCullagh, Judge: Man Can't be Forced to Divulge
Encryption Passphrase, CNET News.com (Dec 14, 2007), available at <http://www.news.
com8301-13578_3-9834495-38.html> (last visited Apr 3, 2008).
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In the meantime, the decade since Clipper has seen the evo-
lution and creation of technologies unlike anything available dur-
ing the last round. In 1994, cryptography was difficult to use and
used by few, 15 and the debate centered on possibilities and pre-
dictions. In contrast, today, cryptography is available in software
that millions of users install and use.
Consider another quiet news event, this one about the evolu-
tion of technological privacy. On October 17, 2007, the online
service Skype, a replacement for the telephone used to conduct
voice conversations over the Internet ("VoIP"), reached an impor-
tant milestone. On that day, ten million Skype users logged in
simultaneously for the first time. 16 Most of these users were not
activists, taking a stand for Internet privacy; most were simply
searching for an alternative to expensive, inconvenient tradi-
tional phone service. Little did they realize that they were also
serving as an important example of the hopes and fears of many
who think about technological privacy.
By default, Skype surrounds every voice conversation in an
unbreakable tunnel of encryption. 17 It is impossible to wiretap a
Skype conversation, at least using traditional methods. 18 If Alice
were to talk to Bob using Skype, then Eve, sitting on a wire
somewhere between the pair, would be unable to decipher what
they were saying. 19
15 See Alma Whitten and J.D. Tygar, Why Johnny Can't Encrypt: A Usability Evalua-
tion of PGP 5.0, Proceedings of the 8th USENIX Security Symposium 169-84 (Aug 23-26,
1999) available at <http://www.usenix.org/events/sec99/full-papers/whitten/whitten
html> (last visited Apr 3, 2008) ("We conclude that PGP 5.0 is not usable enough to pro-
vide effective security for most computer users.").
16 Villu Arak, Stop and Hear the Sound of Skype Passing the 10 Million Simultaneous
Users Mark, Share Skype Blog (Oct 17, 2007), available at <http://share.skype.coml
siteslenl2007/10/stop-and hearthesound_of sky.html> (last visited Apr 3, 2008).
17 Tom Berson, Anagram Laboratories, Skype Security Evaluation ALR-2005-031
(Oct 18, 2005), available at <http://www.skype.comlsecurity/files/2005-031%20security
%20evaluation.pdf> (last visited Apr 3, 2008) (white paper of consultant hired to assess
Skype's encryption implementation); Jaanus Kase, Skype Security and Encryption Review
Now Available, Share Skype Blog (Oct 21, 2005), available at <http://share.skype.com
sites/security/2005/10/skype-security-and-encryption.html> (last visited Apr 3, 2008).
18 Peter Svensson, Associated Press, Skype Use May Make Eavesdropping Passe, USA
Today.com (Feb 16, 2006), available at <http://www.usatoday.comltechnews
computersecurity/2006-02-16-skype-wiretapping-x.htm> (last visited Apr 3, 2008)
("[A]ccording to [security expert Bruce Schneier], if Skype's encryption is weaker than
believed, it still would stymie the kind of broad eavesdropping that the National Security
Agency is reputed to be performing.").
19 It is an age-old cryptographers' convention to populate encryption and wiretapping
hypotheticals with speakers named Alice and Bob (and Carol and Ted); eavesdrop-
pers/would-be decrypters are always named Eve. Diffie and Landau, Privacy on the Line
at 18 (cited in note 3).
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To some, Skype provides the technological privacy all users
need and deserve. 20 Many who feel this way go beyond mere ad-
vocacy by programming, improving, distributing, or funding
Skype or similar projects. 21 To others, the millions of Skype-
encrypted tunnels tentacling throughout the Internet are a
threat to security, a creeping web of technologically-created eva-
sion and subterfuge, enabling and emboldening evil people to do
evil things without fear of detection. 22
Who has the better argument? Should Skype be banned or
pre-installed on every new computer? If, instead of these alterna-
tives, you want a third choice, something in between these ex-
tremes, you would not be acting like the partisans in this debate.
They yearn for technological perfection in ways that will be de-
scribed in Part I. Those in the privacy-enhancing camp wish for
perfect, easy-to-use, easy-to-install programs that reveal the
least amount of information necessary and use robust encryption
to keep data away from third parties. 23
Advocates on the other side want perfect transparency.24
They believe that encryption should be limited to extreme situa-
tions, crippled with backdoors, or perhaps banned. The govern-
ment should be able quickly and easily to access suspicious com-
munications without encountering significant technological hur-
dles.
We should hope neither side gets what they want. There are
problems with both types of perfection, which will be cataloged in
Part II. Perfect transparency causes individual and societal
harms that are well developed in the work of other scholars. Of
specific concern are harms to the heroic dissident or freedom
20 See Brad Templeton, Is Strong Crypto Worse Than Weaker Crypto? Lessons from
Skype, Brad Ideas Blog (Aug 23, 2005), available at <http://ideas.4brad.comnode/263>
(last visited Apr 3, 2008) (EFF board chairman arguing that Skype is important because
it has placed encryption in the hands of many).
21 Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF Joins Forces with TOR Software Project (Dec
21, 2004), available at <http://www.eff.org/press/archives/2004/12/21-0> (last visited Mar
31, 2008) (describing EFF's involvement in the development of a privacy-enhancing tech-
nology known as The Onion Router, or TOR).
22 Consider Louis Charbonneau, Skype Encryption Stumps Police, NZ Herald online
(Nov 23, 2007), available at <http://www.nzherald.co.nz/section/story.cfm?c id=5&
objectid=10477899> (last visited Apr 3, 2008) (describing problems the German police are
having wiretapping Skype-encrypted conversations); David S. Bennahum, Can They Hear
You Now? How the FBI Eavesdrops on Internet Phone Calls (and Why It Sometimes
Can't), Slate (Feb 19, 2004), available at <http://www.slate.com/id/2095777> (last visited
Apr 3, 2008) (discussing difficulty of wiretapping Skype calls).
23 See Part I C.
24 See id.
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fighter who would risk being detected, identified, monitored, and
silenced if he could not communicate privately. Unless he can
find and use tools that allow him to communicate privately, he
will be silenced.
The problem with perfect privacy is less well developed.
Most obviously, perfect privacy enables undetected crime and
unaccountable criminals. One man's criminal, however, is an-
other man's freedom fighter, and there is no technology on Earth
that will help or hinder one without doing the same for the other.
Less intuitively, perfect privacy will be met with direct,
forceful, and most likely effective government countermeasures,
also discussed in Part II. Once enough people can communicate
privately using encryption, governments will pass new, increas-
ingly draconian laws to try to ferret out wrongdoers in other
ways, ironically causing more (and different) harms to privacy
than those that the tools help avoid. Perhaps worse, government
agents will come up with work-arounds: gray-hat surveillance
that we should not want the government to fund or pursue.
Instead of perfection, this Article argues for "struggle": pri-
vacy and transparency-enhancing technology should require the
privacy or transparency-seeker to struggle to achieve what they
seek. Imperfection that leads to struggle avoids the problems
with perfection.
In reality, we are unlikely ever to achieve technological per-
fection, so in one sense this Article is merely a thought experi-
ment. Nevertheless, the debate between security and privacy has
been pitched in the past, and the advocates have aimed for ex-
treme positions. The hope is that recognizing the problems with
perfection will quell desires for both perfect privacy and perfect
transparency and encourage solutions aimed at struggle instead.
After abandoning hopes for perfection, in Part III, the Article
asks to what level of technology should we aspire? Even if we
abandon the endpoints-perfection of either sort-we will face a
sliding scale of varying amounts of transparency and privacy.
These amounts are easier to compare and consider when we re-
place the metaphor of the scale with a model of technological pri-
vacy (or transparency) that spans two dimensions, one that
measures technical robustness and the other that measures user
cost. One such two-dimensional model will be introduced and
used to analyze different technologies.
Lastly, in Part IV, the Article will offer some thoughts about
where on this two-dimensional graph we should reside-how
much struggle is enough? It will propose that technology should
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make it hard but possible for everybody to get what they want.
Freedom fighters and criminals should be able to communicate
privately, but only with effort. Likewise, the police should be able
to find those they seek, but not too easily.
I. TECHNOLOGICAL TRANSPARENCY AND PRIVACY
First, a few definitions are needed. For this discussion, pri-
vacy means control over personal information. 25 Privacy also in-
cludes secrecy, 26 and in particular the secrecy of communica-
tions. These are imperfect definitions, chosen to reflect the par-
ticular and narrow nature of technologically-provided privacy
and transparency, and not in an attempt to pick sides in the
long-running debate about how to define privacy.27
Transparency means the absence of privacy. Put together
with the previous definitions, transparency describes the lack of
control over personal information, or an absence of secrecy.
Transparency, as a value, is closely related to surveillance, the
act that transparency enables. Surveillance is conducted by the
state, by individuals, and by institutional actors, and although
this Article focuses on the state, its conclusions apply to all ac-
tors. Because surveillance, however, has a negative connotation,
I use transparency instead to reflect that transparency-just like
privacy-is a quality that people often celebrate and desire. By
definition, these two terms are complementary. As privacy in-
creases, transparency decreases, and vice-versa.
Online, privacy usually takes one of three overlapping forms.
First, online privacy means the secrecy of personal data such as
the contents of communications. It means that people cannot ac-
cess data and files belonging to others, neither while the data
travels from source to destination nor when they are stored on
computers and in online accounts. Second, online privacy means
the inaccessibility of the transactional records of online behavior.
Thus, people cannot tell when others are logged in, how many
messages they send or receive, who they regard as friends, or
25 See Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom 7 (Atheneum 1967) ("Privacy is the claim of
individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what
extent information about them is communicated to others."); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77
Yale L J 475, 482-83 (1968).
26 See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 Cal L Rev 1087, 1105-06 (2002)
(classifying secrecy as one aspect of a broader conception of privacy).
27 See William M. Beaney, The Right to Privacy and American Law, 31 L & Contemp
Probs 253, 255 (1963) ("[Elven the most strenuous advocate of a right to privacy must
confess that there are serious problems of defining the essence and scope of this right.").
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
which provider they use. Third, online privacy describes the state
of having online acts unlinkable to real-world identity or other
acts. Pseudonymity is another word for this last aspect of pri-
vacy, and in the extreme case, it is called anonymity. Online
transparency means the converse of these three forms.
A. Tools of Online Transparency and Privacy
The tools that are the subject of this Article are pieces of
software that make a person's online activities either more
transparent or more private. 28
1. Transparency.
On the Internet, transparency is the technological default.
Consider what most web browsers-such as Internet Explorer or
Mozilla Firefox-expose to the world. 29 Every time a user uses a
browser to visit a web page, say http://aljazeera.net, personal
information is exposed in two ways. First, the web browser (in
combination with the computer and operating system) reveals a
lot of information about the user to other computers known as
web servers. 30 In our example, the user's web browser tells the
web server for aljazeera.net that the user's computer has a par-
ticular IP address, 31 that the user is using a particular type and
version of web browser, that he prefers to read versions of web
pages written in a particular language, say English or Arabic,
and many other things. 32 Almost always, some of this incoming
information is stored on the aljazeera.net web server, allowing
human operators to review, summarize, use, and disclose the
information to others. 33
28 Other scholars have referred to tools like these as "privacy-enhancing technolo-
gies," usually attributing the term to an article by Herbert Burkert. Herbert Burkert,
Privacy-Enhancing Technologies: Typology, Critique, Vision, in Philip E. Agre and Mark
Rotenberg, eds, Technology and Privacy: The New Landscape 125 (MIT 1997). I am avoid-
ing using that term because Burkert uses it to refer to "technical and organizational
concepts that aim at protecting personal identity." Id. My focus is solely on technical, not
organizational, concepts.
29 See R. Fielding et al, RFC 2616: Hypertext Transfer Protocol-HTTP/1.1 Ch 14
(1999), available at <http://www.ietforgrfclrfc2616.txt> (last visited Apr 3, 2008) (section
of formal definition of web transfer protocol describing "Header Field Definitions").
30 Id.
31 An IP address is a numeric identifier assigned to every computer on the Internet
which is usually-although not always-uniquely identified with each individual com-
puter.
32 Fielding, RFC 2616 (cited in note 29) (enumerating http headers).
33 See Lee Tien, Architectural Regulation and the Evolution of Social Norms, 7 Yale J
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Second, the communications sent or received while web
browsing are sent in the clear.34 Eve, using a computer connected
in the path between the two communicating computers, could
eavesdrop on this conversation and learn that somebody at a
particular IP address visited aljazeera.net, surfed to particular
pages on the aljazeera.net website, and entered particular text
into the fields of the search boxes and other text fields of that
website. 35
Computer programmers often implement transparency not
in conscious opposition to privacy, but because transparency is
the default; it is what one gets when one does not think about
privacy at all. The very essence of a network is the transfer of
information between places, and therefore, unconscious pro-
grammer choices lead directly to transparency. In contrast, pri-
vacy requires conscious choice and specific implementation.
In addition to the inherent, default transparency of the
Internet, many tools are designed to force transparency in situa-
tions that would otherwise involve privacy by enabling online
surveillance. In the prior example, Eve probably used a packet
sniffer, a tool that enables a computer to monitor communica-
tions flowing across a particular point on a network. 36 If a packet
sniffer were connected to a main traffic hub on the network, it
could collect the communications of dozens, maybe even hun-
dreds or thousands of computers.
2. Privacy.
Good privacy online usually comes from encryption. Encryp-
tion refers to techniques that alter information using a secret
code to make the information unintelligible to those lacking the
code. 37 Importantly, there are three different ways in which soft-
ware can use encryption to protect privacy online. First, encryp-
tion is used as it is in Skype, to protect communications "in
flight" from point A to B. Typically, these tools use so-called en-
L & Tech 1, 12 (2004-05) (The popular Apache web server, "by default, records those who
visit a website and post information.").
34 '"In the clear" is a term of art which means without encryption. See Neil Daswani,
Christoph Kern, and Anita Kesavan, Foundations of Security: What Every Programmer
Needs to Know 204 (Apress 2007).
35 See Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law after the USA PATRIOT Act: The Big
Brother That Isn't, 97 Nw U L Rev 607, 649-51 (2003) (discussing tools known as packet
sniffers used to capture network communications in real time).
36 Id.
37 Bruce Schneier, Applied Cryptography 1 (Wiley 1996).
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crypted or secure tunnels, names metaphorically describing the
way they surround communications in layers of encryption.38 In
this Article, this style of technological privacy will be called tun-
nel privacy.
Other tools encrypt data "at rest." These tools can be used,
for example, to protect the privacy of files kept on a hard disk;
information stored on a portable flash drive; or e-mail messages
stored on a provider's computer. 39 This will be referred to as end-
point privacy.
Finally, some tools protect not the content of communication,
but the identity of the person communicating. 40 This will be
called identity privacy. Again, some of these tools use encryption,
but many are far less complex. Anonymizing proxies, for exam-
ple, are intermediary services that act like a trusted, privacy-
obsessed Internet courier, visiting the websites users ask them to
visit, refusing to divulge to third party computers any accurate
information about the users or their computers, and forwarding
content back to the users' computers. 41
B. The Transparency-Privacy Spectrum and the Arms Race
Tools are typically regarded to provide a specific level of pri-
vacy or transparency measured along a spectrum. 42 Part III will
strongly criticize this metaphor, but let us put aside its flaws for
now. The endpoints of the spectrum are perfect transparency and
perfect privacy. Between the endpoints, the level of one value
decreases as the level of the other increases, due to the comple-
mentary nature of privacy and transparency.
Imagine that each computer program could be assigned a
numeric grade from one to ten: ten meaning it would provide per-
38 See Evi Nemeth, Garth Snyder, and Trent R. Hein, Linux Administration Hand-
book 708-710 (Prentice Hall 2007).
39 See id at 696-97 (describing PGP).
40 See Lorrie Faith Cranor, Web Privacy with P3P 36-39 (O'Reilly 2002).
41 See id at 36-37. There is a vulnerability to this type of anonymization: although
the website cannot trace the identity of the visitor, the anonymous proxy itself knows
something more about the user. This is why proxies set up like this tend to have a policy
of refusing to store records about their users. But see Eoghan Casey, Digital Evidence
and Computer Crime: Forensic Science, Computers and the Internet 497 (Academic 2d ed
2004) (quoting administrators of anonymous proxy service known as SafeWeb that log-
files were kept for seven days).
42 See, for example, Lauren D. Adkins, Note, Biometrics: Weighing Convenience and
National Security against Your Privacy, 13 Mich Telecomm & Tech L Rev 541, 552 ("If a
sliding scale is used, gait, as compared with an iris, retinal scan or facial scan ... would
fall on the lower end of the spectrum.").
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fect privacy, one signifying perfect transparency. A well-designed
file encryption program might score a ten, for example; a flawed
tunnel encryptor might score a five; and an email program that
uses no encryption, a one.
For any given computer a collective grade can also be com-
puted, perhaps by summing, or averaging, or calculating the me-
dian of all of the scores for all the programs on the computer. 43
Over time, a computer's grade will change. Sometimes, the grade
will shift a lot, for example lurching toward a better privacy
score when the computer's administrator installs a firewall or
shifting toward a better transparency score when a major new
operating system vulnerability is first discovered. 44 More often,
the grade will move in smaller steps, with new software nudging
the score one way or the other.
We can already begin to see the problems with reducing pri-
vacy and transparency to a single score because this one-
dimensional approach masks a diverse set of measurements. A
score of five might mean that a user's computer would provide
significant tunnel privacy-the user might always connect
through an encrypted tunnel provided by his employer, for ex-
ample-while allowing for complete endpoint transparency-the
user might have inadvertently shared the contents of his unen-
crypted disk with thousands of users of a peer-to-peer network. 45
Alternately, five might mean the computer would provide aver-
age privacy across the board.
Some see computer software marching inexorably toward
better privacy 46 or transparency. 47 This is not unusual, as tech-
43 Because this is a thought experiment, the details are not important. One should
assume that such a score could be calculated, but the method of computation need not be
specified. This is also the reason that other complexities can be ignored. For example, an
operating system is a massive computer program with hundreds, maybe thousands of
different privacy-related functions. For this discussion, the reader should simply assume
that the operating system's score can be computed as an aggregate score of the program.
44 SANS, Top-20 2007 Security Risks (2007 Annual Update), available at
<http://www.sans.org/top20/> (last visited Apr 3, 2008) (listing critical vulnerabilities).
45 See Grant Gross, P-to-P Users Expose U.S. Government Secrets, PC World Online
(July 27, 2007), available at <http://www.pcworld.com/article/id,135167-page,1/
article.html> (last visited Apr 3, 2008) ("Contractors and U.S. government employees are
sharing hundreds of secret documents on peer-to-peer networks, in many cases overriding
the default security settings on their P-to-P software to do so, according to a company
that monitors the networks.").
46 See David Stoll, A Comment on the Encryption Debate, 1998 Stan Tech L Rev 1
("The real reason encryption regulations will not work is that no government alone, not
even the United States, can prevent the inevitable spread of stronger and stronger forms
of encryption."); Froomkin, 1996 U Chi Legal F at 69 (cited in note 5) (noting the National
Research Council's conclusion that "widespread cryptography is inevitable"); National
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nology's progress is often imagined as a march or evolution in a
particular direction, embodied both literally and metaphorically
in rail lines crossing the continent and telegraph wires subma-
rining across the ocean.
The problem with this vision is that privacy and transpar-
ency are developed by two camps of programmers locked in an
arms race, 48 as is often the case with software conflicts. Develop-
ers of tunnel encryption tools try to give users greater privacy,
while developers of packet sniffers provide better transparency.
At any given time, one side holds the upper hand, but the inher-
ent arms race makes the war tend toward stalemate, or at least
makes it very difficult to predict a winner. 49 The arms race
model also focuses solely on the effect of changes internal to the
racing parties. It ignores unexpected outcomes and negative ex-
ternalities.
In fact, many important software developers develop for both
sides of the arms race, pushing further toward stalemate. Manu-
facturers of operating systems, for example, sometimes choose
privacy-installing disk encryption tools by default, for exam-
ple-and sometimes choose transparency-such as keeping disk
encryption turned off by default-usually eschewing privacy in
the name of efficiency or ease-of-use.
Because of the arms race, our tools are usually far from per-
fect. One would not know this, however, by listening to the blus-
ter of the advocates in the field.
Research Council, Kenneth Dam and Herb Lin, eds, Cryptography's Role in Securing the
Information Society 22-50 (National Academy 1996).
47 See Bert-Jaap Koops and Ronald Leenes, 'Code' and the Slow Erosion of Privacy,
12 Mich Telecomm & Tech L Rev 115, 177 (2005) ('The eroding effect of technology on
privacy is thus a slow, hardly perceptible process. There is no precise stage at which one
can stab a finger at technology to accuse it of unreasonably tilting the balance of pri-
vacy."). See also Brin, The Transparent Society at 8-9 (cited in note 8) ('The djinn cannot
be crammed back into its bottle. No matter how many laws are passed, it will prove quite
impossible to legislate away the new surveillance tools and databases. They are here to
stay.").
48 Consider Lee Kovarsky, A Technological Theory of the Arms Race, 81 Ind L J 917
(2006) (discussing arms races); James Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search Engine
Law, 93 Iowa L Rev 1, 13-14 (2007) (discussing the arms race between search engines
and search engine optimization firms).
49 See Brin, The Transparent Society at 282 (cited in note 8) ("I asked Whitfield Diffie
if he felt that ... the outcome of the [encryption] arms race was a foregone conclusion.
Had the advantage been permanently settled in favor of the encryptor, over some team of
well-equipped math wizards trying to break another person's code. Diffie's answer sur-
prised me: 'No, I can't say any such thing. I don't think that's been decided at all.").
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C. The Quest for Perfection
No technology is perfect, and advocates who comment on
privacy and technology in truth almost never advocate for perfect
privacy or perfect transparency. But these advocates clearly
strive for something close to perfection. 50 Perfection, as used
throughout this article, refers to technology that works flawlessly
according to design. 51 For privacy advocates, the goal is wide-
spread encryption, unfettered by government backdoors.
For example, Marc Rotenberg, an outspoken privacy advo-
cate who heads the Electronic Privacy Information Center, has
spoken out several times in favor of widespread encryption and
against government policies he sees as thwarting that goal.
52
Attorneys for the Center for Democracy and Technology, have
made similar comments. 53
The Electronic Frontier Foundation ("EFFP) has expressed
its support for widespread, easy-to-use cryptography more often
through actions, not words. In 1997 and 1998, for example, EFF
funded a project to build a device capable of cracking the DES
encryption protocol. They did this to demonstrate how the gov-
ernment's approved standard for encryption was vulnerable to
50 The brief sketches that follow are necessarily incomplete, as these various organi-
zations have many other pressing concerns aside from technological privacy and trans-
parency. By omitting some of the nuances of their positions, there is a risk of caricature.
Also, individuals in these organizations no doubt hold more subtle, complex views about
these questions. Nevertheless, these groups hold themselves out, institutionally at least,
as committed to a march toward perfect technology.
51 As will be elaborated in Part III, perfection assumes the absence of user error.
52 See, for example, Security and Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE) Act, Hearing
on HR 695 before the House Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong, 1st Sess (Mar 20, 1997) (statement of
Marc Rotenberg, director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center), available at
<http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1997-hrh970320epic.htm> (last visited Apr 3, 2008) ("It
would be foolhardy for our government not to anticipate that strong, unbreakable encryp-
tion will be widely available on the Internet. And it would be equally wrong to prevent
American citizens and American businesses from making use of the best tools available to
protect their sensitive information from potential criminal threats.").
53 See, for example, Wireless Privacy Enhancement Act of 1999 and the Wireless
Communications and Public Safety Enhancement Act of 1999, Hearing on HR 438 and
HR 514 before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protec-
tion of the House Committee on Commerce, 106th Cong, 1st Sess (Feb 3, 1999) (statement
of James X. Dempsey, Senior Staff Counsel, Center for Democracy and Technology),
available at <http://www.cdt.org/testimony/19990203dempsey.html> (last visited Apr 3,
2008) ('CThe current policy of government controls on encryption will not work in the de-
centralized, competitive, global environment where criminals will always be able to ob-
tain strong encryption to shield their communications. The sooner strong encryption is
widely deployed in wireless systems for the rest of the population, the sooner privacy will
be protected and fraudulent theft of services will be curtailed.').
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inexpensive circumvention. 54 Later, EFF sponsored the develop-
ers of privacy-enhancing software known as The Onion Router,
or "TOR.'55
Many computer scientists share the view that widespread
encryption is good, even imperative. Whitfield Diffie and Susan
Landau, for example, claim to argue for less than "an absolute
right of private conversation," not because such a right would be
unwelcome, but because it would be "doomed to failure."56 Still,
their hopes lie in perfection because they see good encryption as
the way to "restore some of the privacy lost to earlier technologi-
cal advances," 57 restoring us to the level of privacy held by our
agrarian forebears. 58 In particular, "ubiquitous use of cryptogra-
phy" is the best choice in their minds because the police will be
able to work around it59 and the "wide dissemination of high-
grade cryptography" could be undone if policymakers realize that
it turns out to be a mistake. 60
Next, consider calls for perfect transparency. Although the
government has not often spoken publicly about encryption in
the past decade, various government agencies have taken posi-
tions that, at their core, advocate perfect transparency. Most no-
table is the government's advocacy for the Clipper Chip and a
law called the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
Act ("CALEA"). 61
CALEA was passed in 199462 to combat law enforcement's
fears that it was losing the wiretapping arms race. 63 As more
people moved away from land-line telephones to cell phones and
54 Electronic Frontier Foundation, Cracking DES: Secrets of Encryption Research,
Wiretap Politics, and Chip Design-How Federal Agencies Subvert Privacy available at
<http://w2.eff.org/Privacy/Crypto/Crypto-misclDESCracker/19980716efftdes.faq> last
updated Jul 16,1998 (last visited Apr 3, 2008).
55 See Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF Joins Forces with TOR (cited in note 21).
56 Diffie and Landau, Privacy on the Line at 9 (cited in note 3).
57 Id at 4.
58 Id at 128 ("Three hundred years ago ... [e]avesdroppers were easily avoided by
walking to a place where one could not be overheard.").
59 Id at 242.
60 Diffie and Landau, Privacy on the Line at 244 (cited in note 3).
61 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub L No 103-414, 108 Stat
4279, codified at 47 USC § 1001 et seq (1994).
62 Id.
63 Froomkin, 143 U Pa L Rev at 743-44 (cited in note 5) ("In its hard sell, the Ad-
ministration, primarily through the FBI, paints a lurid picture of law enforcement
stripped of an essential crime-detection and evidentiary tool-wiretapping-while por-
nographers, drug dealers, terrorists, and child molesters conspire via unbreakable ci-
phers, storing their records and child pornography in computers that become virtual
cryptographic fortresses.").
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the Internet, law enforcement worried that, even armed with
court-issued warrants, it would encounter providers who would
not be able to tap a particular type of line or isolate a particular
type of communication. 64 In other words, the police feared that
the balance between privacy and transparency was tipping
quickly toward too much privacy, and not enough transparency.
The solution was an elaborate new law, administered by the
Federal Communications Commission, which tips the scales
dominantly back toward security interests. Each provider-every
phone company and ISP-is obligated to "ensure that its equip-
ment, facilities, or services ... are capable of expeditiously isolat-
ing and enabling the government, pursuant to a court order or
other lawful authorization, to intercept ... all wire and elec-
tronic communications carried by the carrier within a service
area."
65
The FCC has interpreted CALEA broadly. The FCC has
ruled that, under CALEA, providers are required to provide po-
lice access to the contents encrypted in VoIP systems and the
packets traveling through switches in an Internet provider. 66 In
other words, providers cannot deploy privacy-enhancing tech-
nologies unless they ensure "backdoor" access to the contents of
the communication.
CALEA forces programmers to build transparency into soft-
ware in some situations when developers might have otherwise
chosen privacy. 67 It is a typical example of how law has been
used to try to bring about perfect transparency. Law enforce-
ment's concerns about a tilt of its investigative playing field were
met with a drastic tilt in the opposite direction.
64 Telecommunications Carrier Assistance to the Government, HR Rep No 827-103,
103rd Cong 2d Sess 12-13 (1994) ("[I]t became clear to the Committee early in its study of
the 'digital telephony' issue that a third concern now explicitly had to be added to the
balance, namely, the goal of ensuring that the telecommunications industry was not hin-
dered in the rapid development and deployment of the new services and technologies that
continue to benefit and revolutionize society.").
65 47 USC § 1002.
66 Federal Communications Commission, In the Matter of Communications Assistance
for Law Enforcement Act and Broadband Access and Services, Second Report and Order
and Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 06-56 (May 3, 2006).
67 Some might object that it is difficult for law to influence technology. I disagree
with this proposition, but I will not develop my argument now. Instead, this Article
adopts as a premise that technology should be seen as controllable and contingent.
Whether or not technology should be changed to accommodate policy goals, it can be
changed, and I start from that assumption. The task is to investigate when law should be
allowed to push technology to make it less privacy-protective, if ever at all.
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Similarly, the Clipper Chip would have provided the gov-
ernment with flawless backdoor access to private communica-
tions. Government officials have emphasized how neither
CALEA nor Clipper allow unrestricted government access, be-
cause the government typically still must use a court order to
take advantage of either. 68 For purposes of this article, however,
this argument is not responsive because promises to use court
orders and warrants can later be withdrawn. 69 With both
CALEA and Clipper, the government tried to enable perfect
technological transparency.
Both of these government responses tried to shift from per-
fect privacy-resulting from troublesome hardware in the case of
CALEA, and encryption in the case of Clipper-all the way to
perfect transparency by forcing conditions that would have al-
lowed unencumbered wiretapping.
The FBI demonstrates its desire for transparency not only
through laws and policies, but also in words. In most cases it
frames the debate as a matter of life and death. Arguing for the
Clipper Chip, FBI Director Louis Freeh made countless public
predictions about the grave danger of widespread encryption.
"Advanced technology will make it impossible for the FBI to
carry out court-approved surveillance in life-and-death cases." 70
The FBI often invoked the specter of terrorists-pre 9/11--or
harm to children. 71 The two themes came together in quotes like,
"I doubt that Congress would pass on the opportunity to make
sure that our children were safe from terrorists."72
D. Arms Stockpiling in the Decade Since Clipper
Most of the quotes in the previous Part were uttered during
the very public, bruising debate about the Clipper Chip in the
early 1990s. That debate gave way to a subsequent decade of
68 See Question 19, Are FBI Special Agents Permitted to Install Wiretaps at Their
Own Discretion?, Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act AskCALEA,
"Frequently Asked Questions", available at <http://www.askcalea.net/faq-answers/
019_faq.html> (last visited Apr 3, 2008) (stating that FBI agents are not permitted to
install wiretaps without court order).
69 See Froomkin, 143 U Pa L Rev at 762-63 (1995) (cited in note 5) ('The Attorney
General's [Clipper key escrow] procedures themselves are merely directives. They are not
even legislative rules, which might be subject to notice and comment restrictions before
being rescinded.").
70 Froomkin, 143 U Pa L Rev at 746 n 151 (cited in note 5).
71 Id at 743-44.
72 Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF Quotes Collection 19.6 (Apr 9, 2001), avail-
able at <http://w2.eff.orglMisc/EFF/?f=quotes.eff.txt> (last visited Apr 4, 2008).
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surprising silence. There have been a few public squabbles, most
notably the FBI's moves to expand the interpretation of CALEA
in FCC rulemaking and the privacy community's mostly failed
attempts to rebuff those interpretations. In 2004, the FBI filed a
petition with the FCC-the agency given interpretative rulemak-
ing power under the law-to interpret CALEA to cover not only
digital telephone networks but also broadband Internet networks
and VoIP calls. 73
But the most striking, and until now mostly unobserved, de-
velopments have been in the technological arms race, as new
tools that can bolster or pierce privacy continue to be created and
deployed by parties on all sides.
Programmers continue to improve encryption, making it in-
creasingly available to the masses. Skype is not the only example
of seamless, invisible privacy that users enjoy by default. A tun-
nel encryption technology known as Secure Sockets Layer
("SSL") 74 is shipped with every modern web browser; although
most users probably do not know SSL by name, many know that
the little lock icon in their browser (which represents an SSL
connection) signifies protected privacy. Many users of BitTor-
rent, a peer-to-peer protocol useful for transferring large files,
use tools that encase data within encrypted tunnels. 75
Developers are incorporating encryption not only to create
tunnel privacy, but also to protect the stored files of the masses.
For example, Microsoft has created two complementary systems,
BitLocker and encrypted file system ("EFS"), that together en-
crypt data stored on hard drives. 76 If these technologies were to
become widespread, the FBI would have grave difficulties ana-
lyzing seized computers. 77 Perhaps responding to law enforce-
ment's concerns, Microsoft has chosen not to provide this tech-
73 Federal Bureau of Investigation and Drug Enforcement Administration, In the
Matter of United States Department of Justice, Joint Petition for Rulemaking to Resolve
Various Outstanding Issues Concerning the Implementation of the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Mar 10, 2004, available at <http://www.cdt.org/
digi-tele/20040310fbipetition.pdf> (last visited Apr 4, 2008).
74 Alan 0. Freier, Philip Karlton and Paul C. Kocher, The SSL Protocol, Internet
Draft (Mar 1996), available at <http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-freier-ssl-version3-01> (last
visited Apr 4, 2008).
75 See note 191 and accompanying text.
76 Jamie Morris, Notes on Vista Forensics, Part One, SecurityFocus (Mar 8, 2007),
available at <http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1889> (last visited Apr 4, 2008).
77 Id.
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
nology to every Windows user, limiting the spread of the technol-
ogy, and hence the FBI's grief.78
On the other side, developers of tools that force transparency
continue to improve their products, as well. The FBI spent much
of the past decade tamping down the controversy about its
packet sniffing, filtering tool known as Carnivore. 79 Despite the
fact that, to some, Carnivore has become a stand-in for menacing
technologies that the FBI and NSA can use to "eat" all of our pri-
vate information, the technology was actually a relatively mun-
dane packet sniffing and filtering system.80 In 2005, reports sur-
faced that the FBI had stopped using Carnivore, turning to stan-
dard, off-the-shelf products instead.8' If true, this move may
have been motivated by the public controversy, but it is also
likely that the FBI decided to get out of the sniffer-writing busi-
ness because the private sector did it so well.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH PERFECTION
We should hope that we end up with a world of neither per-
fect transparency nor perfect privacy. There are significant
harms that would result from either extreme. Those problems
will be described in depth, but first consider the benefits of an
alternative to perfection, what I am calling struggle.
A. Struggle
When policymakers weigh the tradeoffs between privacy and
transparency they emphasize balance, perhaps imagining the
need to fiddle with the volume knob on a stereo amplifier to find
the perfect level. The experts advising them feed this imagery,
fixated as they are on extreme positions: perfect privacy (turn
the volume all the way up) and perfect transparency (turn the
volume all the way down).
Privacy advocates want as much privacy as possible and the
FBI wants perfect surveillance. Even when both sides are willing
to concede the acceptability of something less than perfect, their
18 Id (reporting that BitLocker is available in Vista Enterprise and Ultimate and EFS
is available in the Business, Enterprise, and Ultimate editions).
79 See Kerr, 97 Nw U L Rev at 651-54 (cited in note 35).
80 Id at 654.
81 Xiaomin Huang, Peter Radkowski, III, and Peter Roman, Computer Crimes, 44 Am
Crim L Rev 285, 324 n 326 (2007) available at <http://www.securityfocus.com/
news10307> (last visited Apr 4, 2008) (citing Kevin Poulsen, FBI Retires Its Carnivore,
SecurityFocus (Jan 14, 2005)).
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concessions tend to hover near the extremes, coming nowhere
near balance. If ten is perfect privacy and one is perfect trans-
parency, privacy advocates might concede that privacy should
sometimes give way when lives are in danger, an eight or a nine,
but in no other situations. Likewise, the FBI might concede that
communications between attorneys and clients should be very
difficult to pierce, but it would never accept anything above two
or three. The policymaker aiming for five will be steered away
from potentially good but imperfect solutions by both sides.
Instead of balance, policymakers should embrace a different
metaphor-struggle. Transparency and privacy should come only
with struggle, only at a cost. It should be difficult for speakers to
attain robust, easy privacy, and it should be hard for eavesdrop-
pers to force seamless, easy transparency.
To understand why struggle is better (or even different) than
balance, think about the limitations of the balance metaphor.
Things in balance tend to be unstable. The arms of a scale, a
tightrope walker, even a checkbook-these things teeter precari-
ously when balanced, and without constant attention, they fall
out of balance.
Struggle inverts the usual analysis, thereby avoiding many
of the problems that result from tiptoeing along the tightrope.
Struggle is a negative value, defined by what it is not. It is not a
statement of where we should be along the spectrum; it instead
describes where we should not be, at the extreme ends. Perfect
privacy and perfect transparency should both be avoided.8 2
Historically, the technological status quo has ensured strug-
gle, so we have not had to think about it. Consider cash. Cash is
often mythologized in legal scholarship as a technology of perfect
anonymity.8 3 But cash does not provide perfect anonymity. Many
82 So long as privacy and transparency are seen as sitting along a one-dimensional
spectrum, struggle suffers from some of the same problems as balance-a little struggle is
never enough. We will return to these problems in Part III, but the important point for
now is that struggle is a better goal than balance for finely calibrating the power relation-
ship between the government and criminal targets.
83 As a typical example:
The simplest means of facilitating anonymity is the use of cash, as opposed to
credit or other smart card devices. Payment with cash does not require verifica-
tion of credit or identity, and the name of the purchaser is not registered. Thus,
no link is formed between the participant in the transaction and his actual
identity or other patterns of behavior. Cash, therefore, is the basic "ano-
nymizer."
Tal Z. Zarsky, Thinking outside the Box: Considering Transparency, Anonymity, and
Pseudonymity As Overall Solutions to the Problems of Information Privacy in the Internet
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criminals are caught despite having used cash in their crimes.
Cash is an imperfect technology for privacy. Its value is realized
only through transfer, yet transfers also generate the risk of dis-
covery. A drug buyer might snitch; a merchant selling a pre-paid
cell phone might remember the buyer's physical description.
Cash can be booby-trapped or seeded with traceable serial num-
bers.8 4
Instead of perfection, cash ensures investigatory struggle. It
is not easy to investigate criminals using cash. Cash forces the
police to engage in expensive operations. Compare the struggle
introduced by cash to the near-perfection possible with the soft-
ware tools described in this article. These tools have the poten-
tial to tip the investigative playing field so much, they introduce
risks and fears rarely encountered in transactions occurring en-
tirely within the physical world. 85
To understand why perfection is dangerous and struggle is
necessary, consider the following pair of thought experiments
about the consequences of zero struggle at opposite ends of the
privacy-transparency spectrum: what problems arise when the
police can surveil too easily or when speakers can communicate
without detection?
B. The Problem with Perfect Transparency
Perfect transparency silences people struggling against their
governments, those known as freedom fighters or dissidents (de-
pending on one's point of view). 86 When a dissident's online com-
munications and identity are transparent, government agents
Society, 58 U Miami L Rev 991, 1026 (2004). But see A. Michael Froomkin, Flood Control
on the Information Ocean: Living with Anonymity, Digital Cash, and Distributed Data-
bases, 15 J L & Comm 395, 472 (1996) ("[I]t should be noted that paper money is not as
anonymous as it may seem.").
84 Froomkin, 143 U Pa L Rev at 727 n 58 (cited in note 5) ("U.S. paper money is not
completely anonymous, however, because each (authentic) bill carries a unique serial
number and bills can be marked to facilitate tracking.).
85 Id at 817-18 ("Cryptography allows unprecedented anonymity both to groups who
communicate in complete secrecy and to individuals who, by sending electronic mail
through anonymizing remailers, can hide all traces of their identity when they send mail
to other persons.").
86 Although the phrase "freedom fighter" conjures most easily the image of the pro-
testor living in a totalitarian state, of course, dissidents live in every nation. No matter
the form of government, states throughout history have tried to monitor their dissidents,
to greater or lesser extent. In the United States, for example, the history of wiretapping
has been checkered and problematic. See Diffie and Landau, Privacy on the Line at 137-
48 (cited in note 3) (cataloging abuses of wiretapping by American law enforcement from
the 1940s to the 1990s).
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can monitor his communications, rifle through his stored files,
and attribute pseudonymized speech to him.87 These acts specifi-
cally deter dissidents, by allowing them to be harassed or impris-
oned, and generally deter others by creating the fear that if they
too dissent, they will be watched. In a world of too much trans-
parency, perhaps it is simply best not to dissent.
Even for non-dissidents, transparency leads to a long list of
individual and societal harms, which have been well documented
by other scholars.88 A world of perfect surveillance would be a
world where the police could chip away at individual dignity and
autonomy. 89 It would be a world where we would never be able to
remove our external masks, and we would lose the ability to "try
out" different personas, to develop into who we would want to
become. 90 In short, surveillance, made possible by transparency,
strips the individual of dignity, autonomy, a sense of repose, and
the capacity for self-determination. 91
87 Froomkin, 143 U Pa L Rev at 820 (cited in note 5) ("Groups seeking to change the
social order in ways likely to be resented by the police and others in positions of power
will have reason to fear that state actors will find ways to access their [cryptographic]
keys.").
88 See, for example, Solove, 90 Cal L Rev at 1099-1126 (cited in note 26); Paul M.
Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 Conn L Rev 815, 818-19 (2000); Jerry Kang,
Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 Stan L Rev 1193, 1212-17 (1998).
89 These value are usually captured under the umbrella value, the protection of per-
sonhood. The idea of privacy relating to personhood is often traced back to Paul Freund,
who defined personhood as "those attributes of an individual which are irreducible to
selfhood." American Law Institute, 52nd Annual Meeting 42 (1975); Solove, 90 Cal L Rev
at 1116 (cited in note 26).
90 Kang, 50 Stan L Rev at 1219-20 (cited in note 88) ("The ability to maintain diver-
gent public and private personae creates the elbowroom necessary to resist social and
political homogeneity.).
91 Although this Article describes the connection between technology and some sig-
nificant harms, some of these harms turn not on the amount of privacy we have, but de-
pend instead on the amount of privacy we think we have. Take the harm to an individ-
ual's sense of repose. One loses repose when he worries that he is being watched, regard-
less of whether anybody is watching. The reverse is also true: the person who is continu-
ously watched can still find repose, so long as he mistakenly thinks he has privacy. Tools
which increase privacy decrease the harm to the sense of repose only if the user under-
stands what the tool can do. In this sense, then, some of these harms are remediable only
through public education, not through tools.
Similarly, the government will often overreact to the threat or promise of future
privacy-enhancing technology, even when the reality is much less threatening. Very of-
ten, law enforcement officials press for legislative change, spurred by fears of potential
power, even if they cannot prove that the power is being used. I explored this type of
response, which I call the Myth of the Superuser, in another article. Paul Ohm, The Myth
of the Superuser: Fear, Risk, and Harm Online, 41 UC Davis L Rev 1327 (2008). Because
the Myth so often rests on questionable empirical evidence, I have argued that policy-
makers should rarely act if the only evidence of a looming problem are unsupported
claims of potential online power. Id at 1393-96.
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Others value privacy for properly calibrating the relation-
ship between the person and the state. It prevents a "creeping
totalitarianism, an unarmed occupation of individuals' lives. ' 92
Some see it as giving us the space for the development of inti-
macy. 93 A final group of scholars, branded by some as part of a
"New Privacy" movement, 94 go a step farther, looking past harms
to individuals from insufficient privacy, and arguing instead that
the result of these individual harms is a loss to society gener-
ally. 95 For example, robust democratic deliberation itself requires
the privacy to speak freely and experimentally, to try out new
ideas. 96
C. The Problem with Perfect Privacy
The problems with perfect privacy have been discussed less
by scholars. In a world with perfect privacy, evildoers-including
garden-variety computer criminals, online terrorists, and enemy
soldiers-would have an easier time acting with impunity. Truly
anonymous speech would protect the identities of (and prevent
detection of possible planning by) those who send death threats,
blackmail, and conspiratorial messages. 97
This is an important-albeit often exaggerated-harm, but
it is so intuitive as to need little elaboration. We know that bad
people will take advantage of technological privacy; what other
concerns arise? Consider two significant yet underappreciated
harms resulting from the ways powerful entities-and in particu-
lar governments-would react to perfect privacy. 98 These power-
ful entities, threatened by technological privacy, 99 would launch
countermeasures causing significant and underappreciated
92 Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 Harv L Rev 737, 784 (1989)
93 Julie C. Inness, Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation 74-94 (Oxford 1992).
94 Paul M. Schwartz and William M. Treanor, The New Privacy, 101 Mich L Rev
2163, 2177 n 33 (2003) (listing legal publications on "New Privacy").
95 Schwartz, 32 Conn L Rev at 834 (cited in note 88) ("Put simply, access to personal
information and limits on it help form the society in which we live in and shape our indi-
vidual identities.").
96 See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 Vand L Rev 1609,
1653-58 (1999).
97 There are other, lesser concerns, such as identifying those who post defamatory
messages or those who illegally traffic in copyrighted materials.
98 The focus of the following is on government countermeasures. Powerful private
sector players may engage in some of these types of countermeasures as well.
99 Of course, powerful entities would benefit from increased privacy, too. Neverthe-
less, I predict that the threat will spur these entities to act, even if it means reducing
their own access to technological privacy.
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harms. These underappreciated harms are as significant as the
threat of undetectable crime.
1. Government countermeasures I: new legislation.
The police would likely tell compelling and convincing sto-
ries of the potential for undetectable crime to judges and legisla-
tors to support calls to change or reinterpret the law, perhaps in
the wake of some future attack. 00 Courts and Congress might
respond by sanctioning new tools and techniques and by relaxing
civil liberties. 101 These laws would likely take one of two forms.
First, they may, like CALEA, target the developers of privacy-
enhancing technologies, forcing them to reengineer their systems
to make them more vulnerable to law enforcement demands.
Second, these laws might target the people communicating, try-
ing to force them to disclose their passwords or other security
measures in the face of a law enforcement investigation. 10 2 In
either case, these laws would be probably used frequently (maybe
even exclusively) against people who are not using privacy-
enhancing technology, 0 3 harming instead people who were not
the original justification for the rule.
100 Writing in the late 1990's, after the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center but
before 9/11, David Brin made some chillingly prescient statements:
As a mental experiment, let's go along with FBI director Freeh and try to envis-
age what might have happened if those bombers had actually succeeded in top-
pling both towers of New York's World Trade Center, killing tens of thousands.
Or imagine that nuclear or bio-plague terrorists someday devastate a city. Now
picture the public reaction if the FBI ever managed to show real (or exagger-
ated) evidence that they were impeded in preventing the disaster by an inability
to tap coded transmissions sent by the conspirators. They would follow this
proof with a petition for new powers, to prevent the same thing from happening
again.
Such requests might be refused nine times in a row, before finally being granted
on the tenth occasion. The important point is that once the bureaucracy gets a
new prerogative of surveillance, it is unlikely ever to give it up again. The effect
is like a ratchet that will creep relentlessly toward one kind of transparency,
the kind that is unidirectional.
Brin, The Transparent Society at 206-07 (cited in note 8).
101 Id; Ohm, 41 UC Davis L Rev at 1348-57 (cited in note 91).
102 See, for example, Adam Liptak, If Your Hard Drive Could Testify ... , (cited in note
14) (describing court's holding that the government could compel a Canadian citizen
named Sebastian Boucher to produce the password protecting his computer's files without
violating his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination); Phillip R. Reitinger,
Compelled Production of Plaintext and Keys, 1996 U Chi Legal F 171.
103 See also Ohm, 41 UC Davis L Rev 1349-52 (cited in note 91) (arguing how expan-
sions to 18 USC § 1030's prohibitions on computer hacking are often used to prosecute
unsophisticated actors).
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2. Government countermeasures II: gray-hat surveillance.
Even more worrisome than changes to the law would be
what I call gray-hat surveillance. The adjective comes from com-
puter security jargon where "black hats" are people with unam-
biguously evil motives, "white hats" are the good guys, and "gray
hats" fall in ethically murky areas in between. 0 4 I use gray-hat
surveillance to describe an anticipated shift in police practices
into the darker, more ethically murky areas of computer pro-
gramming and surveillance.
Law enforcement agencies, and in particular the FBI, will
feel pressure to build software tools to blunt the effect of better
and more widespread privacy-enhancing software. Before de-
scribing why gray-hat surveillance is harmful, let us explore why
it is useful for the police.
a) Privacy's analog hole. It may seem inconsistent on the one
hand to imagine a world of "perfect" privacy-enhancing technol-
ogy while on the other hand speaking about gray-hat surveil-
lance which can defeat perfection. To resolve this seeming con-
tradiction, we must sharpen what we mean when we say "per-
fect." Perfect privacy-enhancing technology tends to protect
robustly but incompletely.
Consider encrypted tunnels again. Perfect encryption, by
definition, cannot be pierced. ' 0 5 Thus, encrypted tunnel privacy
makes it impossible for a person with access to a wire between
the two communicating parties to wiretap the communication. In
the case of the communications of suspected criminals, an en-
crypted tunnel renders the FBI deaf, but only when agents are
sitting somewhere in the middle, on the wire. If instead the
agents were to find a way to access the endpoints of the commu-
nication, they could grab messages as they were sent, before they
have been wrapped in encryption, or received, after they have
been decrypted. 10 6
104 Dean J. Champion, The American Dictionary of Criminal Justice: Key Terms and
Major Court Cases 114, 267 (Roxbury 3d ed 2005) (definitions of "gray hat", "black hat,"
and "white hat").
105 This discussion is focusing exclusively on ways around perfect technology. It is
important not to forget also that if the technology is imperfect, attackers may find the
vulnerabilities. See Brin, The Transparent Society at 285 (cited in note 8) ("Even if the
keys are never cracked by brute force, the deciphering algorithm may be flawed, or com-
promised by some intentional or unforeseen 'back door."').
106 Even without ever listening to communications using the methods described in this
subpart, the police can sometimes learn enough from the non-content attributes of a
communication to identify or locate the speaker. This highlights the difference between
tunnel and identity privacy. See Part I A 2.
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Think of this like the privacy of a high fence with a gate. The
fence prevents many privacy invasions: if it is solid, people can-
not peer through it; if it is tall, people cannot climb it; if it is
thick, people cannot eavesdrop through it. But as things travel
through the gate, they can be intercepted just before they enter
or as soon as they emerge, and privacy can thereby be breached.
Legal scholars often err when assessing cryptography, focusing
too much on how impossible it is to break--on the height of the
fence-ignoring the other ways people can circumvent even good
cryptography-by waiting at the gates. 107
For example, if the FBI could somehow aim a hidden video
camera at a target's computer screen or keyboard, it could track
his communications, even if he were using an encrypted tun-
nel. 08 Better yet, the police could install a "key logger" on the
target's computer. 0 9 Key loggers are software or hardware de-
vices installed surreptitiously on a target's computer, which re-
cord every key pressed on the keyboard or snapshots or videos of
everything that flits across the screen. 110
The fact that a key logger can work despite the use of robust
encryption can be thought of as privacy's version of the analog
hole, a term that arises in the intellectual property debate over
Digital Rights Management ("DRM"). DRM technologies are used
In 2006, tracking the non-content attributes of a communication helped the U.S. police
find fugitive Kobi Alexander, former CEO of Comverse, who had fled to Sri Lanka after
being indicted for defrauding his shareholders. Eric Bangeman, Fugitive Exec Nabbed
after Skype Call, Ars Technica (Aug 24, 2006), available at <http://arstechnica.coml
news.ars/post/20060824-7582.html> (last visited Apr 4, 2008). After Alexander placed a
one-minute phone call from Skype, the authorities were able to trace him down (pre-
sumably through his IP address) and bring him back into custody. Id.
107 See, for example, Ric Simmons, Why 2007 Is Not Like 1984: Broader Perspectives
on Technology's Effect on Privacy and Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 97 J Crim L &
Criminol 531, 546 (2007) ("[Tlhere is no type of responsive surveillance technology that
can be used to counteract the greater privacy enjoyed by individuals (including criminals)
who make a serious effort to encrypt their communications.").
108 No doubt, the FBI is harnessing miniaturization as a way of getting cameras unob-
trusively into private places. Consider Charlie White, DeIFly II, Just the First of a Long
Line of Tiny Flying Robot Spycams, Gizmodo (Nov 2, 2007), available at
<http://gizmodo.com/gadgets/eye-on-you/delfly-ii-just-the-first-of-a-long-line-of-tiny-flying-
robot-spycams-318161.php> (last visited Apr 4, 2008) (describing a robotic dragonfly with
on board camera); Brin, The Transparent Society at 285-86 (cited in note 8) (describing
the development of miniature cameras). Of course, if the government wanted to use such
a camera to monitor a place where the people monitored had a reasonable expectation of
privacy, it would require at least a search warrant under the Fourth Amendment. People
v Dezek, 308 NW2d 652 (Mich App 1981) (holding that video surveillance of activity
within stalls of public restroom is a Fourth Amendment search).
109 United States v Scarfo, 180 F Supp 2d 572 (D NJ 2001) (describing investigation
using key logger to intercept passwords).
110 Id.
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by the owners of content-such as music, movies, or software-to
control how users can access the content. DRM, for example,
might allow users to watch a movie on his desktop computer but
would prevent him from copying the video to his laptop or dis-
tributing it across a peer-to-peer network.11' The analog hole is
an inherent vulnerability in DRM systems, arising from the fact
that content can be captured as it is being listened to or
viewed. 112 A movie or television show playing on a screen, for
example, can be filmed by a video camera, resulting in a de-
graded-quality but watchable copy, unencumbered by DRM. 11
Just as with DRM, technologically-provided privacy has an
analog hole. Regardless of how encryption is used to protect the
privacy of communications (be they in-flight, in storage, or used
to anonymize identity) the communication must be created with
a keyboard or output to a screen. If the government can take con-
trol of a user's keyboard or screen, it can take advantage of pri-
vacy's analog hole to defeat even the best encryption. " 4
b) The Timberline High case. The police exploit privacy's
analog hole by borrowing the tricks of hackers, spyware creators,
and virus writers. Consider a recently revealed example of police
gray-hat surveillance. 115 The FBI could not have wished for more
sympathetic facts to justify aggressive surveillance: the pursuit
of the anonymous author of several email messages threatening
to blow up Timberline High School, in Lacey, Washington. 116
The anonymous messages were both chilling-going into
great detail about where bombs would be placed-and taunting-
repeatedly daring investigators to try to track the anonymized
messages across the Internet.1 7 The suspect had routed at least
some messages through a computer in Italy, and the FBI had
111 See Douglas C. Sicker, Paul Ohm, and Shannon Gunaji, The Analog Hole and the
Price of Music: An Empirical Study, 5 J Telecomm & High Tech L 573, 574 (2007).
112 Id at 576.
113 Id at 577.
114 See Brin, The Transparent Society at 220 (cited in note 8) ("[E]ncryption would
have stymied hardly any of the surveillance techniques used by the Gestapo, or Beria's
NKVD, let alone the far more advanced abilities that will be available in an age of gnat
cameras, data ferrets, and spy satellites.").
115 Kevin Poulsen, FBIs Secret Spyware Tracks Down Teen Who Made Bomb Threats,
Wired.com (July 18, 2007) available at <http://www.wired.comnpolitics/law/news/2007/
07/fbi spyware> (last visited Apr 4, 2008).
116 Application and Affidavit of Norman B. Sanders, Jr., FBI Special Agent, for Search
Warrant (filed June 12, 2007), available at <http:/Iblog.wired.coml27bstroke6/files/
timberlineaffidavit.pdf> (last visited Apr 4, 2008).
117 Id at 3.
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already asked its Italian counterparts for help. 118 The FBI had
also tracked several leads to several ISPs and had obtained re-
cords from those sources, but apparently to no avail. 119
With no other leads, the FBI used spyware to track the tar-
get. 120 Broadly speaking, the term spyware describes programs
that run surreptitiously on a computer, tracking users and re-
porting private information about their computer usage to an-
other person on the Internet.' 2' Typically, spyware programs are
installed when users are tricked into launching them, sometimes
by clicking on a link on a website, opening an emailed attach-
ment, or after being attacked by a network worm or virus. 122
Historically, spyware programs have been developed in the
shadows, funded by small companies, usually seeking to turn the
captured usage data into targeted advertising. 123 These compa-
nies, which typically call what they sell "adware" not spyware,
protest that they are not vandals (unlike most virus writers) but
legitimate marketers, unfairly branded as evil or criminal. 124
The Timberline affidavit reveals that the FBI is now a mem-
ber of this group of small, ethically-murky developers (or at least
purchasers) of spyware. In the affidavit, the agent calls the FBI's
tool a Computer & Internet Protocol Address Verifier, or
CIPAV. 125 The affidavit goes into very few details, classifying the
CIPAV "as a law enforcement sensitive investigative technique,
the disclosure of which would likely jeopardize other on-going
investigations and/or future use of the technique."' 26 In particu-
lar, the affidavit makes no mention of how the FBI was planning
118 Id at 11-12.
119 Id.
120 Application and Affidavit of Norman B. Sanders, Jr. (cited in note 116).
121 Alfred Cheng, Comment, Does Spybot Finally Have Some Allies?: An Analysis of
Current Spyware Legislation, 58 SMU L Rev 1497, 1500-06 (2005) (describing four types
of spyware); Susan P. Crawford, First Do No Harm: The Problem of Spyware, 20 Berkeley
Tech L J 1433, 1434 n 2 (2005) (citing one definition of "spyware" but noting how difficult
the term is to define).
122 See Cheng, 58 SMU L Rev at 1501-04 (cited in note 121) (describing class of spy-
ware that install themselves "without the users' knowledge").
123 See Ben Edelman, Why I Can Never Agree with Adware and Spyware, The Guard-
ian 5 (Jan 25, 2007) ("Adware vendors defend their practices as 'targeted advertising."').
124 See Paul Festa, See You Later, Anti-Gators?, CNET News.com (Oct 22, 2003),
available at <http://www.news.com/See-you-later%2C-anti-Gators/2100-1032_3-5095051
.html> (last visited Apr 4, 2008) (describing libel suits brought by Gator against anti-
spyware companies stating that "Gator maintains that its software differs from spyware
in that people are clearly notified before they download it, and in that they do so in ex-
change for a service, like the peer-to-peer software.").
125 Application and Affidavit of Norman B. Sanders, Jr. at 2-3 (cited in note 116).
126 Id at 5.
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to install the CIPAV. The affidavit does reveal that the CIPAV
was to collect "the computer's true assigned IP address, MAC
address, open communications ports, list of running programs,
operating system (type, version, and serial number), Internet
browser and version, language encoding, registered computer
name, registered company name, current logged-in user name,
and Uniform Resource Locator ("URL") that the computer was
previously connected to."127
The magistrate judge signed the warrant, the CIPAV in-
fected the target's computer, and a suspect was found and ar-
rested. 128 In many ways, this is a great success story. A terror-
ized community found peace, a terrorist was caught, and the only
privacy invaded was the privacy of an alleged criminal. Despite
this success, the FBI's use of spyware raises a number of poten-
tial troubling harms.
c) Gray-hat harms. The Timberline case shows the great vir-
tue of gray-hat surveillance: it helped the police arrest a terrorist
undetectable using traditional methods. But despite this value,
the police use of spyware raises great risks.
There are at least five reasons to fear the police acting like
hackers and spyware writers. The first is the effect that such
behavior will have on the economy and legitimacy of virus and
spyware writing. To get into the spyware-authoring game, the
police will have two choices, both fraught: develop the software
and techniques in-house or contract out to third parties.
The FBI's 2008 budget request allocates $220,000 to "pur-
chase highly specialized equipment and technical tools used for
covert/overt search and seizure forensic operations .... This
funding will allow the technology challenges including bypass,
defeat, or compromise of computer systems."'129 This is a rela-
tively miniscule line item in the FBI's six billion dollar annual
budget, 130 but in a world where criminals use more and better
privacy-enhancing technology, this line item will likely grow in
absolute dollars and as a percentage of the entire FBI budget.
This would be money poured into the development of tools that in
the wrong hands could be used for very bad purposes; it would be
127 Id.
128 Poulsen, FBI's Secret Spyware (cited in note 115).
129 Federal Bureau of Investigation, FY 2008 Authorization and Budget Request to
Congress 4-69 to 4-70 (2008), available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/2008justification/
office/33 Oljustification.doc> (last visited Apr 4, 2008).
130 Id.
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money expended by the government to advance the state of a not-
so-noble art.
It would be naive to hope that the FBI would take informa-
tion from the gray-hat community without giving back in kind.
For one thing these tools would be distributed, sometimes to
other law enforcement agencies and more troublingly through
installation on targets' computers. In the Timberline case, the
target's computer was infected by the FBI's program, and even
the FBI probably has no way of knowing whether copies still re-
side in other computers or email inboxes. If the FBI were to ad-
vance significantly the art of computer exploitation-for exam-
ple, if it were to discover an undocumented OS vulnerability 131 -
it would need to unleash its innovation "in the wild" in order to
gain its benefits, giving others the chance to find and reverse
engineer the code. 132
Worse than in-house development is providing government
money to third parties to develop these tools, thereby placing an
FBI seal of approval on these activities, legitimizing and but-
tressing a previously underground, shadowy market in exploits
and vulnerabilities. 133
Second, these acts violate user privacy. Unlike many police
practices, such as snitches or pen registers, which target the un-
wisely trustworthy, 134 spyware tends to target people who have
intentionally sought privacy through encryption or other means.
This is, in part, why many laws have been enacted targeting
spyware, hacking, and viruses as criminal privacy violations.135
131 Software security flaws that are unknown until they are first launched are known
as "zero day" vulnerabilities. See generally Kevin D. Mitnick and William L. Simon, The
Art of Intrusion (Wiley 2005).
132 See Gregg Keizer, What We Know (Now) About the FBI's CIPAV Spyware, Com-
puterworld (July 31, 2007) (speculating that the spyware used by FBI in the Timberline
High case exploited a known, not zero day, vulnerability).
133 Some scholars argue that a market for vulnerabilities would lead to better secu-
rity. See, for example, Rainer Bohme, Vulnerability Markets: What Is the Economic Value
of a Zero-Day Exploit?, Private Investigations (Proc of 22nd Chaos Communication Con-
gress), available at <http://www.inf.tu-dresden.de/-rb21/publications/Boehme2005_22C3
VulnerabilityMarkets.pdf> (last visited Apr 4, 2008); Micah Schwalb, Exploit Derivatives
and National Security, 9 Yale J L & Tech 162 (2007).
134 Hoffa v United States, 385 US 293, 302 (1966) (holding use of informant to obtain
incriminating statements not a Fourth Amendment search or seizure); Smith v Mary-
land, 442 US 735 (1979) (holding use of pen register not a Fourth Amendment search).
135 Many states have passed laws attempting to provide criminal and civil liability
against people who create and distribute some forms of spyware. See Peter Brown, Spy-
ware and Pretexting: Recent Developments, 894 PLI/Pat 267, 273 n 7 (2007) (listing state
statutes). The Federal government has proposed similar laws but has not passed any to
date. Id at 274 & n 12. Hacking and viruses are prohibited under various Federal laws.
See, for example, Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 18 USC
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Of course, this is a variation on an old theme. The police have
long violated criminal laws and social norms to accomplish their
goals. 136 But this history is neither worth celebrating nor per-
petuating. Ironically, by deploying better privacy-enhancing
technology users may be exposing themselves to new kinds of
governmental privacy invasions. 137
Third, the government's use of spyware, hacking, and vi-
ruses to search and seize would raise many tricky, novel Fourth
Amendment questions.138 These difficult questions would pose a
risk of muddying even more the already-confusing body of Fourth
Amendment law.
Fourth, there is a significant accountability problem. For one
thing, the police would be able to send spyware and viruses di-
rectly, without involving third party intermediaries like ISPs,
placing more of their activities in the shadows and making the
§ 1030 (2000 & Supp 2005) (banning various forms of computer hacking); Communica-
tions Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 18 USC § 2511 (2000 & Supp 2005) (prohibit-
ing wiretapping, including the interception of electronic communications); Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, codified within various sections of title 18 at § 2701
(2000 & Supp 2005) (prohibiting access to communications stored on an ISP's servers); Id
at § 3121 (prohibiting the use of pen registers and trap and trace devices, defined else-
where as devices configured to capture "dialing, routing, addressing and signaling infor-
mation"). Some of these laws have express exceptions for law enforcement investigations.
See, for example, 18 USC § 1030(f) ('This section does not prohibit any lawfully author-
ized investigative, protective, or intelligence activity of a law enforcement agency of the
United States, a State, or a political subdivision of a State, or of an intelligence agency of
the United States.").
136 See, for example, Olmstead v United States, 277 US 438, 480 (1928) (Brandeis
dissenting) ("To prove its case, the government was obliged to lay bare the crimes com-
mitted by its officers on its behalf. A federal court should not permit such a prosecution to
continue.").
137 Others have made similar arguments:
Encryption, oddly enough, may lead to greater violations of privacy than would
otherwise have occurred. For example, if investigators encounter unbreakable
encryption on a wiretap, they may well pursue other methods of surveillance,
including hidden microphones, cameras, and other sensors installed on the sub-
ject's premises. Undercover operations are another alternative. These meth-
ods-which are quite legal under certain conditions-are often not only more
dangerous to the subject and to law enforcement officials, but also more inva-
sive to the subject's privacy.
Amitai Etzioni, The Limits of Privacy, 80 (Basic 1999).
138 See, for example, United States v Forrester, 495 F3d 1041 (9th Cir 2007) (holding
that the ISP-assisted monitoring by the government of the to/from lines of e-mail mes-
sages, the IP addresses of websites visited, and the total volume of information sent did
not violate the Fourth Amendment); United States v Gorshkov, No CROO-550C, 2001 WL
1024026, at *1 (W D Wash 2001) (analyzing whether FBI agents violated the Fourth
Amendment when they accessed and copied files located in Russia of a Russian citizen
under surveillance in the U.S.)
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acts less likely to come to public attention.139 Even worse, these
tools would be so complex and sophisticated that it is likely that
only the programmers developing them would be well positioned
to compare risks and benefits. Very likely, not even the line
agents they work with nor their superiors would understand the
tools as well as they should. The problem would get worse up the
chain of authority, with the supposedly most politically account-
able people of all-appointed officials in the front offices of the
FBI and DOJ-understanding the tools only through many lay-
ers of translation, analogy, and metaphor.
Finally, we should be concerned about bugs. Software fails at
predictable rates. 140 Software developed to solve a one-off prob-
lem is more susceptible to bugs than software developed for a
long-term problem. Bugs can reveal more private information
than intended or allowed; they can cause damage to computers
and networks; and they can run out of control.
3. Government countermeasures III:
indiscriminate surveillance.
The other likely response is more indiscriminate surveil-
lance. Deafened by encryption, the police might argue for more
dragnet surveillance, engaging in massive wiretapping or data
mining. They will argue that although they cannot listen in on
the conversations of their targets, they can still gather evidence
by looking for patterns of behavior and by reconstructing net-
works of relationships. 141
139 Consider how long it took for the public to learn about the NSA's surveillance of
online communications, and financial transactions despite the involvement of dozens, if
not hundreds, of employees of third-party intermediaries. See James Risen and Eric
Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, NY Times Al (Dec 16, 2005)
(reporting about presidential order first signed in 2002); Eric Lichtblau and James Risen,
Bank Data Is Sifted by U.S. in Secret to Block Terror, NY Times Al (June 23, 2006) (re-
porting on program initiated shortly after September 1, 2001); Mark Klein, Wiretap Whis-
tle-Blower's Account, Wired.com (April 7, 2006), available at <http://www.wired.com/
science/discoveries/news/2006/04/70621> (last visited Apr 4, 2008) (public statement of
former AT&T technician Mark Klein, who revealed details of AT&Ts participation in
NSA wiretapping).
140 See Ohm, 41 UC Davis L Rev at 1371 n 234 (cited in note 91).
141 See generally, David E. Pozen, Note, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and
the Freedom of Information Act, 115 Yale L J 628, 630 (2005) ('The 'mosaic theory' de-
scribes a basic precept of intelligence gathering: Disparate items of information, though
individually of limited or no utility to their possessor, can take on added significance
when combined with other items of information.").
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
D. Beyond the Thought Experiment
Because privacy-enhancing technology is created through an
arms race, perfection will probably never be achieved. 142 Every
advance in privacy enhancement will be met by an advance in
transparency forcing. Given this fact, this discussion has been at
best a thought experiment, an attempt to examine the harms
that would occur if we were ever to have perfect technology.
The lessons of the thought experiment should inform the de-
bate on two levels. First, it might give advocates who desire per-
fection a moment's pause. 143 Staunch advocates will continue to
press for perfection, of course, but they should be cautioned to be
careful what they wish for. For example, EFF could continue to
support projects like TOR in ways that make the software more
robust and capable, but EFF should not encourage operating sys-
tem manufacturers to incorporate TOR-like technology onto
every desktop.
Second, for non-advocates, and especially for the technolo-
gists and policymakers who will shape the next generation of
privacy- and transparency-enhancing technology, a better appre-
ciation of the limits of perfection could help guide future deci-
sion-making. Software developers should consider the dangers of
perfection when planning how to invest time and resources in
improving privacy technology. The next time policymakers are
asked to consider a bill like CALEA, they should first assess
whether technology is closing in on perfection. Even if it is, they
should craft laws and regulations that do not try to shift technol-
ogy all the way from perfect privacy to perfect transparency, as
CALEA tries to do, but they should instead focus on making
technology "less perfect."'144
The problem with acting on this advice, however, is it relies
on the ability to assess when a technology is "perfect" or "near
perfect" in providing privacy and transparency. Thus far, this
Article has only sketched what is meant by these muddy terms.
The next Part seeks to provide a more nuanced, less monolithic
understanding of technological capability, and a tool for mapping
technologies across the capability landscape. In particular, mov-
142 See Part I B; Brin, The Transparent Society at 184 (cited in note 8) ('TMillions of
expert-worker-hours have already gone into perfecting the encryption-anonymity option,
without coming anywhere near perfection so far.').
143 Part I C.
144 See Part IV B.
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ing away from perfection encourages greater attention to strug-
gle. How can struggle be introduced and maintained?
III. MEASURING PERFECTION
If we are convinced that both perfect privacy and perfect
transparency are undesirable and should be avoided, we need a
metric for measuring the state of technology at a given time. Is a
privacy-enhancing technology too effective? Are there too many
transparency-enhancing tools? Again, the common metric for this
kind of measurement is the spectrum from no privacy to no
transparency, but as we shall see, this model is of little use to
policymakers. Before looking at the spectrum model's shortcom-
ings, consider a few observations about the causes of our inclina-
tion to perfection.
A. The Source of the Misguided Calls for Perfection
Calls for technological perfection stem from many aspects of
the debate between privacy and transparency. Legal scholars
frame privacy's and transparency's harms in all-or-nothing ways,
thereby contributing directly to mistaken calls for perfection.
Computer scientists do something very similar. Advocates rely
too much on idealized standard bearers-terrorists and freedom
fighters-without recognizing that technology cannot discrimi-
nate between the two groups.
1. Perfection and the connection to scholarship.
Scholars who write about information privacy conceive of the
topic in a manner that leads to calls for perfection. They imagine
that the harms from transparency and privacy are catastrophic
and accrue at the slightest breach. With one revelation or misuse
of personal information, people's lives unravel.
Consider first how scholars talk about harms from privacy
invasions to a victim's sense of repose. The sense of repose is
treated like a delicate, fragile thing. It shatters as soon as an
individual senses any fear of being watched. Meanwhile, scholars
who urge transparency take a similar, one-misstep-and-disaster
approach when arguing for broad law enforcement authorities. 145
145 See Etzioni, The Limits of Privacy at 81 (cited in note 137) ("Consideration should
be given, however, not only to the probability that a given event will occur but also the
magnitude of the disaster if it does.').
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Instead of thinking of transparency's harms as all-or-
nothing, maybe it is more accurate to think of an almost-
mathematical relationship between transparency (or privacy)
and harm. If one pair of conspiratorial criminals could communi-
cate without the FBI listening in, there would be much less to
worry about than if one hundred or one thousand could do the
same. Likewise, if Congress could raise struggle and decrease the
number of tools of perfect privacy the FBI should welcome the
change even if other perfect privacy tools remain.
This works for privacy-enhancing tools as well; if policy
changes could empower five more dissidents to communicate in
private, that would be cause for celebration, even if five hundred
still could not. By focusing on struggle, we can learn to celebrate
and strive for incremental results, rather than lament our inabil-
ity to get perfection or to find balance.
2. Perfection and computer science.
Computer scientists view the world of technological privacy
in a similarly binary way. They import this from the way they
think about and research cryptography. Cryptographers measure
their algorithms against the ideal of perfection, seeing anything
short of perfection as flawed and therefore non-robust. Crypto-
graphic methods are measured by the number of years it would
take for a brute-force attacker to crack the scheme. 146 An encryp-
tion protocol that theoretically would require three trillion years
to crack using brute force methods would be considered broken
and in need of replacement if a vulnerability would allow a crack
that takes merely one trillion years. 147 To the lay observer, this
may seem wildly overcautious, but it is actually pragmatic, be-
cause experience has shown that any theoretical flaw, even one
146 See Schneier, Applied Cryptography at 153 (cited in note 37) (displaying table of
"Average Time Estimates for a Hardware Brute-Force Attack in 1995').
147 As an example of both of these fears about "broken" algorithms, consider the MD5
hash algorithm. In 1996, MD5 was claimed to be vulnerable because its signature-making
feature could be faked in less than brute force time. Hans Dobbertin, Cryptanalysis of
MD5 Compress (1996), available at <http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu68442.html> (last visited
Apr 4, 2008). To the lay observer, this probably would not have seemed to be an impor-
tant moment, because breaking the algorithm meant spending many times the age of the
universe. But the research led in 2004 to many practical implementations of faked MD5
signatures, computed relatively rapidly. Xiaoyun Wang and Hongbo Yu, How to Break
MD5 and Other Hash Functions, in Ronald Cramer, ed, Advances in Cryptology-
Eurocrypt 2005, 23 (Springer Berlin 2005). In other words, the early, theoretical fears of
broken MD5 led down the road to realistic attacks.
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that requires geologic time to exploit, will lead eventually to ex-
ploits that operate on a human timescale.148
But this tendency to see encryption only as "perfect or
flawed" translates poorly into the world of privacy policy. Cryp-
tographers, who are sometimes asked to advise on the concept of
"privacy," may confuse theory and policy. That millions of users
continue to use a flawed wireless encryption algorithm may seem
outrageous from a theoretical, technical point of view, but from a
policy or economic point of view, it may be perfectly reasonable.
3.The freedom fighter/criminal equivalence.
Turn next to advocates. Each side in the debate over privacy
or transparency has embraced a standard bearer, the object of its
hopes or fears. For those who urge privacy, he is the heroic free-
dom fighter, the dissident living under a totalitarian regime.149
For those who urge transparency, he is the villainous criminal or
terrorist.
Technology cannot distinguish between saint and sinner. Al-
though it is nice to imagine that dissidents can access technology
that criminals cannot, this is an impossible hope. 150 Technology,
once released, is available to all.
In fact, the forces that distribute technology unequally
across a population probably behave the opposite of what we
would choose. These forces seem likely to deprive dissidents of
tools that criminals will have, not the other way around. For ex-
148 See Wang and Yu, "How to Break MD5 and Other Hash Functions," (cited in note
150) (describing vulnerability in prominent "digesting" algorithm MD5 which can be
exploited in "15 minutes up to an hour computation time").
149 See notes 184-85 and accompanying text (describing the work of Patrick Ball to
teach dissidents about technologies of privacy).
150 As Stewart Baker-then General Counsel for the NSA-put it during the Clipper
Chip debate:
Take for example the campaign to distribute PGP... encryption on the Inter-
net. Some argue that widespread availability of this encryption will help Lat-
vian freedom fighters today and American freedom fighters tomorrow. Well, not
quite. Rather, one of the earliest users of PGP was a high-tech pedophile in
Santa Clara, California. He used PGP to encrypt files that, police suspect, in-
clude a diary of his contacts with susceptible young boys using computer bulle-
tin boards all over the country.... If unescrowed encryption becomes ubiqui-
tous, there will be many more stories like this. We can't afford as a society to
protect pedophiles and criminals today just to keep alive the far-fetched notion
that some future tyrant will be brought down by guerrillas wearing bandoleers
and pocket protectors and sending PGP-encrypted messages to each other
across cyberspace.
Stewart A. Baker, Don't Worry Be Happy, Wired 2.06 (June 1994).
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ample, people often need resources-money, skill, training, ex-
perience-to use tools. Although there are both well-funded
criminals and well-supported freedom fighters, one suspects that
the wealthiest criminals command more resources than the best-
supported dissidents. If this were true and if a new law or regu-
lation would mean that technology would be limited only to those
with resources, 151 then sadly, dissidents would lose access long
before criminals do.
B. Critiquing the One-Dimensional Model
Thus far, technology has been viewed one dimensionally,
from providing more transparency to more privacy. The meta-
phor has been a spectrum, and policymakers have been depicted
as selecting an optimal place along that spectrum. The spectrum
is a problematic metaphor.
To understand why, ask, how does the spectrum encourage
people to value or measure the relative privacy provided by a
tool? What does it mean to say that TOR provides "better" or
"more" privacy than BitTorrent? Most likely, assertions like this
refer to a quality of software that could be called robustness. To
be robust, a cryptographic tool must be built upon fundamental,
mathematical algorithmic underpinnings that are theoretically
sound. But this is not enough, as the best theory is useless unless
software developers created a tool that correctly implements the
theory.
When a technology is said to provide "good privacy," the
speaker usually means nothing more but that the tool is robust.
This is an incomplete assessment of privacy because it neglects
the many other factors that make a tool privacy-enhancing. By
viewing technological privacy as a one-dimensional spectrum, a
volume knob, a fuel gauge, technologists and policymakers are
neglecting these other factors.
Further, as discussed earlier,152 while a drive toward perfec-
tion is appropriate for scientists designing cryptographic proto-
cols, it does not translate well into policy. Policymakers and ad-
vocates, perhaps influenced by such computer scientists, come to
believe that the only choices are perfect privacy or perfect trans-
151 See John Markoff, Technology: Wrestling Over the Key to the Codes, NY Times 9
(May 9, 1993) (quoting Whitfield Diffie: "By codifying the Government's power to spy
invisibly on these contacts, we take a giant step toward a world in which privacy belongs
only to the wealthy, the powerful and, perhaps, the criminals.").
152 See Part III A 2.
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parency. The participants in the debate, with the spectrum
metaphor in mind, are likely to see technology problems as ei-
ther-or questions. Should we have absolute privacy or none?
Consider again the CALEA debate. CALEA is an either-or
solution. In place of wiretap-proof communications technologies,
which are bad, Congress and the FCC force wiretap-enabling
backdoors, which are good. Framing the problem and the solu-
tion like this flows directly from the metaphor. Swing the pendu-
lum, push the slider, flick the switch, from one pole to the other.
A final problem with one dimensionality is that it too often
fosters slippery slope arguments. The surface of a slippery slope,
after all, is a one-dimensional path from point A to point B.
When privacy and transparency are pictured as a single, meas-
urable quantity like robustness, it is easy for advocates to fix on
the endpoint in the direction they want to move. Further, it be-
comes easy to demonize the endpoint at the opposite end of the
spectrum, because that way lies danger. Technologically-
provided privacy and transparency should instead be seen as
values that map across several dimensions, with slopes in many
directions, some going up, others going down, with lots of pla-
teaus in between, across a bumpy landscape. Instead of an inexo-
rable drive toward slippery slope arguments, multi-dimensional
thinking could lead toward intermediate plateaus, to spaces of
good enough privacy, to more nuanced positions.
C. Adding a Second Dimension: The Privacy Matrix
All of these problems diminish when other values or attrib-
utes are considered. Policymakers and technologists should con-
sider a complex of different things that add up to a given level of
privacy or transparency. But what else besides a tool's robust-
ness should be considered? If one dimension would be too few,
how many dimensions should be considered? Two? Three? More?
The answer is to focus on the harms described in Part II. If
these were the most important problems with perfection, then
varying the level of privacy would mean varying things that con-
tribute to these harms. What features of software cause the type
of harms described?
The other touchstone for developing the model is simplicity.
What is sought is a tool that regulators and innovators can use to
measure the state of technology and map it onto policy concerns.
In the end, only one other value-albeit a compound value
made up of separate constituent values-is important enough
and maps closely enough onto Part II's harms to be included in
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the analysis, especially given the goal of simplicity: a measure of
a tool's cost.
One quick note-the discussion that follows will focus en-
tirely on privacy-enhancing technology, without stepping
through the complementary discussion about transparency-
enhancing technology. This is to simplify the discussion. Every-
thing said in what follows can be restated as a mirror-image
about transparency.
Why should policymakers focus only on robustness and cost,
excluding other considerations? Let us look at each in turn.
1. Robustness.
Although there are pitfalls to a single-minded focus on a
tool's robustness at the expense of every other attribute, it re-
mains one of the most relevant measures of technology. The ro-
bustness of a tool is the amount of effort required by an adver-
sary to defeat the privacy provided.
Robustness almost always refers to the strength of the cryp-
tography underlying the privacy technology. The robustness of
cryptography turns on a few factors including the cryptographic
method chosen (the algorithm), the success of the specific soft-
ware implementation (are there bugs?) and, most famously, the
length of the key used to encrypt. Holding the first two factors
constant, the longer the key used, the harder it is for would-be
codebreakers to decipher the encoded message. Applying the
three factors to an example, communications can be encrypted
using the Triple-DES algorithm, as implemented by the
OpenSSH open source programming team, with 64-bit keys. 153
With the same algorithm and implementation, 128-bit keys
would provide more robustness.
It is crucial to remember also that technologically robust
privacy is possible without encryption. For example, many WiFi
hotspots tend to be unencrypted, yet they still provide a good
level of anonymity because they allow people to walk up, connect,
communicate, and leave. If the communication sent during that
brief association were one that someone would like to track-a
death threat or a call to overthrow a ruthless dictator, for exam-
ple-the user's identity would probably be hard to find.
153 See Neils Ferguson and Bruce Schneier, Practical Cryptography (Wiley 2003) (de-
scribing OpenSSH).
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2. Cost.
The other value that is as important as robustness to meas-
uring the privacy of a tool or groups of tools is a group of attrib-
utes collectively referred to as "cost." Technologies are installed
and used only if users are willing and able to meet their costs. A
robust but high-cost technology will be used only by some people,
even if others could benefit from its robustness. Conversely, a
non-robust but low-cost technology may be used by many people,
without providing a significant amount of privacy.
Cost refers to a number of different things. Perhaps the most
important component of cost is a tool's ease-of-use. The most ro-
bust privacy-enhancing technology would be worthless if it were
so difficult to use that nobody ever uses it. 154 Ease-of-use is often
a measure of user-friendliness. Operating systems with graphical
user interfaces are much easier to use-they are more user-
friendly-than the command-line interfaces that came before. 155
Similarly, tools used to encrypt email messages have historically
been very hard to use. 156 At one point, sending an encrypted
email message-a message that only a person with a previously-
agreed-upon key could read-required installing a piece of dedi-
cated software, authoring the email message in an email pro-
gram, cutting-and-pasting that message into the encryption
software, clicking a button, cutting-and-pasting the resulting
ciphertext back into the email program, and, finally, sending. 157
Even this long list neglects the separate, equally complex pre-
requisite task of trading secret keys.
Another type of user cost is accessibility, which encompasses
two separate attributes-ease of installation and default set-
tings. As for the first, technology is most easy to install-in that
it need not be installed-if it comes bundled with a computer. 158
It is less easy to install if it needs to be downloaded from the
154 See Diffie and Landau, Privacy on the Line at 206 (cited in note 3) ("In writing
PGP, Phil Zimmermann did something for cryptography that no technical paper could do:
he gave people who were concerned with privacy but were not cryptographers (and not
necessarily even programmers) a tool they could use to protect their communications.").
155 Consider Neal Stephenson, In the Beginning ... Was the Command Line (Peren-
nial 1999).
156 See Simson L. Garfinkel, Thesis: Design Principles and Patterns for Computer
Systems That Are Simultaneously Secure and Usable Ch 5 (MIT 2005); Whitten and Ty-
gar, Why Johnny Can't Encrypt: A Usability Evaluation of PGP 5.0 (cited in note 15).
157 Garfinkel, Design Principles and Patterns for Computer Systems at Ch 5 (cited in
note 156).
158 J. Gregory Sidak, An Antitrust Rule for Software Integration, 18 Yale J Reg 1
(2001) (describing the practice of software bundling).
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Internet. The hardest technologies to install are those that re-
quire extensive configuration or source code compilation.
There is an extensive literature about the crucial role of de-
fault choices in law. 159 More recently, scholars have applied this
earlier work to discuss how software defaults can have a pro-
found impact on online conflict and regulatory decisions. 160
Cost is too often ignored in debates about technological pri-
vacy. An obsessive focus on whether the NSA can break a par-
ticular tool often masks the much more important question-is a
tool likely to end up in the hands of people needing privacy, or
will the tool's costs limit it to the computers of a very few?
3. The privacy matrix.
These two dimensions-robustness and cost-can be mapped
on a two-by-two matrix, with the rows representing cost and the
columns representing robustness.
FIGURE 1
Cost / Privacy Not Robust Robust
I II
Hard to Use / First generation wire- Anonymizers (TOR),
Hard to Get / less privacy (WEP) older encryption tools
Banned for stored files (PGP),
older encrypted tun-
nel tools (SSL)
III IV
Easy to Use / IP addresses, Gmail Newer encrypted
Easy to Get / tunnel tools (Skype
Installed by De- and BitTorrent),
fault newer encryption
tools for stored files(BitLocker and EFS))
159 See, for example, Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Con-
tracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L J 87 (1989).
160 See, for example, Jay P. Kesan and Rajiv C. Shah, Setting Software Defaults: Per-
spectives from Law, Computer Science and Behavioral Economics, 82 Notre Dame L Rev
583 (2006); Kang, 50 Stan L Rev at 1246-65 (cited in note 88) (considering default rules
for online information privacy analyses).
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It is hoped that Figure 1 becomes a standard tool for meas-
uring the impact and regulation of privacy-impacting software.
We can map various technologies into the four quadrants of the
matrix. Type I technologies are hard to use and provide some,
but not very robust, privacy. Type II technologies provide robust
levels of privacy but are difficult to use or install. A large as-
sortment of present-day technology falls in this category. Type III
technologies are very easy to use and install, often because they
come built-in with a computer or because they can be
downloaded directly and easily from the Internet, but they do not
provide a robust level of privacy. Finally, Type V tools provide
very good privacy and are easy to use and install. Although his-
torically there have not been many products that fit within Type
IV, the number is increasing.
To better understand the differences and connections be-
tween the four quadrants of the matrix, consider the following
examples, grouped into the familiar three categories of privacy
bestowed: tunnel, stored, and identity privacy.
4. Examples: mapping tunnel privacy.
The typical tunnel privacy problem is this: Alice would like
to use the Internet to chat with Bob, but she is worried about the
wiretapping Eves of the world.
If Alice and Bob choose not to use any privacy-enhancing
technology, then by default they would be choosing a Type III-
low cost, low robustness-solution. In fact, there is almost no
cost in this choice: the tools they need to communicate via email
or instant messaging are installed on their computers by default.
These are consumer-grade programs designed for average users,
meaning the software is probably very easy to use. Still, Alice
and Bob would be almost unprotected from wiretappers when
using Type III solutions. 161
When Alice moves her laptop onto a wireless, WiFi network,
she may (or may not) have the opportunity for a bit more tunnel
privacy. An infamous Type I-high cost, low robustness-form of
tunnel privacy technology is Wireless Equivalent Privacy
("WEP") which is used to protect communications being sent
161 "Almost unprotected," not "completely unprotected" because the Internet itself
provides some latent privacy protection. Just as a would-be land-line phone wiretapper
needs to find a wire across which a particular conversation flows, on the Internet, a
would-be wiretapper needs access to a communications hub across which a particular e-
mail or chat session routes.
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across WiFi networks. WEP is infamous because it is known to
be flawed. Soon after WEP was released, cryptanalysts discov-
ered weaknesses in WEP's encryption. 162 A motivated third party
could intercept encrypted WEP content and decipher the com-
munications. As if this were not enough, WEP networks are also
difficult to configure, requiring a user to key-in ten or twenty-six
seemingly random characters.
WEP spotlights a puzzle about Type I technology: why does
the market give rise to and support the growth of Type I tech-
nologies? Should not a well-functioning market preclude or kill
off Type I technologies, as consumers opt for cheaper or easier-to-
use alternatives? 6 3
In fact, the market has already provided an alternative to
WEP. The Wi-Fi Alliance, an industry trade group, created a
successor system known as Wi-Fi Protected Access ("WPA").
WPA is more robust than WEP, making it perhaps Type II tech-
nology, and it is also a bit easier to use, particularly because it
allows a server to have one, user-selected password, which can be
entered in a way that is likely familiar to users. 164
The story of the slow transition from WEP to WPA demon-
strates why markets sometimes create Type I technologies. Es-
pecially when privacy is not a top priority for a software devel-
oper, or when the developer does not have access to well-trained
cryptographers, attempts to engineer privacy will fall flat. 165 The
162 See Nancy Cam-Winget, et al, Security Flaws in 802.11 Data Link Protocols, 46
Commun of the Assoc for Computing Machinery 35 (May 2003) ('The... attack is devas-
tating to WEP. Once the WEP key is discovered, all security is lost.").
163 One explanation for the presence of Type I encryption technology is the govern-
ment's regulation of the export of cryptography. Froomkin, 1996 U Chi Legal F 19 (cited
in note 5) ("Largely because of the ban on export of strong cryptography, there is today no
strong mass-market standard cryptographic product within the U.S. even though a con-
siderable mathematical and programming base is fully capable of creating one.'). After
the vulnerabilities in WEP were revealed, the Chair of the standards body responsible for
WEP blamed, among many other things, the government's export controls. See Chair of
IEEE 802.11 Responds to WEP Security Flaws, Slashdot.org, Feb. 15, 2001 available at
<http://it.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=O1/02/15/1745204> (quoting Stuart J. Kerry, Chair of
IEEE 802.11 Standards Working Group: "In addition it needs to be noted that the choice
of encryption algorithms by IEEE 802.11 are not purely technical decisions but they are
limited by government export law restrictions as well.") (last visited Apr 4, 2008).
164 Although WPA is easier to use than WEP, it probably is not easy enough to use to
classify it as Type IV.
165 Comparing these Type I and Type Ill examples demonstrates a limitation of the
two-by-two matrix: it masks some relatively fine distinctions. For example, although they
are both in the same robustness column, Type I technologies often provide better privacy
protection than Type III technologies. This is because Type 1II technologies-easy-to-use
but non-robust-include the many default situations in which user privacy is unpro-
tected. Better than a two-by-two matrix, perhaps, is a scatter plot across X- and Y-axes.
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market seems slow to correct these Type I "mistakes." According
to many studies, years after WEP's vulnerabilities were disclosed
and WPA was offered as an alternative, WEP is still widely de-
ployed. 166
For Type II-high cost, high robustness-tunnel privacy, Al-
ice and Bob can turn to encrypted tunnels. With a lot of techno-
logical know-how, the pair can establish a dedicated encrypted
channel-a form of the Virtual Private Network, or VPN, often
used by business travelers-through which they could stuff email
or instant messages. 167
Skype is a classic example of Type TV tunnel privacy. 168 Al-
though some expertise is needed before a user can find,
download, and install Skype, this process has been made rela-
tively easy to do, and once the software is installed, users enjoy
the benefits of encrypted communication, whether they know
they have it or not. All of the difficulty Alice and Bob encoun-
tered in configuring a VPN would be handled by Skype's pro-
grammers, who would have hidden all of the technical detail be-
neath Skype's friendly user interface.
Some of the costless, privacy-less Type III technologies exist further to the left along the
X-axis than many Type I offerings.
166 Peter Sayer, Don't Use WEP, Say German Security Researchers, InfoWorld.com
(April 4, 2007), available at <http://www.infoworld.comIarticle/07/04/04/HNdontusewep_
i.html> (last visited Apr 4, 2008) ("Many networks still rely on WEP for security: 59
percent of the 15,000 Wi-Fi networks surveyed in a large German city in September 2006
used it, with only 18 percent using the newer WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access) protocol to
encrypt traffic. A survey of 490 networks in a smaller German city last month found 46
percent still using WEP, and 27 percent using WPA.").
167 In fact, there is a user-friendlier form of encrypted tunnel that even casual web
browsers tend to know about known as SSL or Secure Sockets Layer. SSL is familiar, if
not by name then by the little "lock" icon that sometimes appears in a web browser. When
the little lock appears, web pages are wrapped in a tunnel of encryption as they are
downloaded. To use SSL, all a web surfer needs to do is visit a website hosted by a pro-
vider who provides SSL.
Is SSL a Type IV-low cost, high robustness-technology? After all, any user with
virtually any web browser can use SSL with ease, just by entering a URL or clicking on a
link. SSL seems as low-cost as a technology can be. On the contrary, although SSL puts
very few burdens on the user, it is still difficult for the person (or institution) communi-
cating on the other end-the person setting up the SSL-protected web page. If Alice
wants Bob to be able to download secret launch codes on an SSL-protected website, Alice
needs to enable SSL on her web server, meaning at the very least she needs to juggle
secret keys. Furthermore, SSL adds cryptographic overhead to a web transfer, slowing it
down. Because of these costs, webmasters tend to use SSL only when it is important, and
there are many more unencrypted than encrypted web pages on the web.
168 Staying Safe on Skype: Privacy FAQs, available at <http://www.skype.com/
security/safety/safety.html> (last visited May 6, 2008) ("When you call another Skype
user your call is encrypted with strong encryption algorithms ensuring you privacy.").
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5. Examples: mapping identity privacy.
Consider a few examples of technologies which provide iden-
tity privacy. Perhaps the most widely-used example of Type III
identity privacy is the privacy afforded by pseudonymous free
email account services like Yahoo! Mail, Microsoft's Hotmail, and
Google's Gmail. With services such as these, users can set up a
new email account in minutes. Although messages sent with
such an account are protected by a pretty good level of pseudo-
nymity which the average user might view as very robust, the
privacy protection has limits.
First, to every outbound email message sent from Hotmail,
the service appends metadata called the X-Originating-IP
header. 16 9 This short string of data reveals to the recipient of the
message (and anybody in between who happens to be listening)
the IP address of the computer from which the message was sent.
Second, all of these services retain records relating to users and
messages found on its servers. Law enforcement agents armed
with appropriate legal process can compel these services to re-
veal that information.
An example of Type II identity privacy software is TOR, or
The Onion Router. 170 TOR is a type of "mix network." 171 A mix
network is structured in some ways like a peer-to-peer software
trading network. It lets people send Internet communications
through a random series of peer computers also running TOR
before arriving at its destination. Through a series of clever cryp-
tographic tricks (beyond the scope of this Article), none of the
computers in the middle of the path can access the content of the
communications nor discover the IP addresses of both the send-
ing and receiving computers. 172 Despite its promise, TOR does
not come pre-installed on any operating system, and although
TOR is easier to use than the consumer encryption available a
decade ago, 173 it is still a challenge. 174
169 See Casey, Digital Evidence and Computer Crime at 507 (cited in note 41). Yahoo!
and Gmail provide the same information, in different e-mail headers.
170 <http://torproject.org> (last visited Apr 4, 2008).
171 See David L. Chaum, Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses, and Digital
Pseudonyms, 24 Commun of the Assoc for Computing Machinery 84 (Feb 1981) (seminal
paper on mix networks).
172 The first computer in the chain knows the IP address of the sending computer but
not the receiving computer. The last computer contacted knows the IP address of the
receiving computer but not the sending computer.
173 See Whitten and Tygar, Why Johnny Can't Encrypt: A Usability Evaluation of PGP
5.0 (cited in note 15).
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6. Examples: mapping endpoint privacy.
Finally, focus on some endpoint privacy tools. At least his-
torically, most endpoint privacy has come from Type II encryp-
tion tools that are robust but difficult for the average user to use.
For many years Pretty Good Privacy ("PGP") by Phil Zimmerman
was hailed as an easy-to-use and robust program which could
encrypt, among other things, the content of stored email mes-
sages. The reality failed to meet the hype. First, users had to
download and install PGP, no doubt made more difficult because
the U.S. government suggested that PGP could not be
downloaded over the Internet without violating laws and regula-
tions limiting the export of cryptography. 175 Visitors to the PGP
website had to choose between U.S. based and foreign-based
servers, with ominous-sounding warnings about the legal conse-
quences of an incorrect choice. Once a user managed to install
PGP, she would then be faced with the intricacies of key man-
agement, a notoriously tricky problem raised by all public key
cryptography solutions. 176 Users in the mid-1990s were forced to
save keys to floppy disk or on printouts, and they were exhorted
not to lose those critical physical objects, lest they lose access to
all of their secrets.
With time, some endpoint privacy tools have become much
easier to use, perhaps crossing the border between Types II and
IV. An example of Type IV endpoint privacy is Microsoft's
BitLocker and EFS system. This operating system feature en-
crypts all data on a user's computer's hard drive. While the user
is logged in, the data is decrypted in the background and on the
fly, appearing to the user as ordinary data. But when the com-
puter is shut down, the data sits on the computer's hard drive
protected by encryption, and even the FBI would find it difficult
if not impossible to decrypt the information. 177 Both BitLocker
174 For example, a researcher with the Berkman Center posted what he hoped was a
"simpler, more step by step guide" to using TOR for bloggers which-in Step One alone-
required downloading and installing four separate pieces of software. Ethan Zuckerman,
Anonymous Blogging with TOR, Global Voices Blog, available at <http://www.
globalvoicesonline.orgladvocacy/anonymous-blogging-with-tor/> (last visited Apr 4, 2008).
175 Consider Matthew Parker Voors, Encryption Regulation in the Wake of September
11, 2001: Must We Protect National Security at the Expense of the Economy?, 55 Fed
Commun L J 331 (2003).
176 See Ferguson and Schneier, Practical Cryptography at 309 (cited in note 153) (call-
ing key management "without a doubt, the most difficult issue in cryptographic sys-
tems").
177 A person with physical access to a BitLocker/EFS-protected computer may be able
to read the key out of memory. See John Markoff, Researchers Find Way to Steal En-
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and EFS come installed with some versions of Windows Vista. 178
Perhaps in an acknowledgement of law enforcement concerns,
BitLocker is never enabled by default. 179
IV. STRUGGLE
The discussion has thus far has been largely descriptive. The
two-dimensional view of technological privacy and transparency,
the mapping of this into four general quadrants of technology,
and the identification of the harms that inhere with each type,
can be used to create a sort of "report card" of the state of any
particular technology. It can be used solely as a descriptive tool
to passively track the twists and turns of future technological
development, enabling better informed policy discussions.
I also advance a prescriptive and normative goal: to use the
taxonomy, incorporating the earlier discussion of struggle, to ar-
gue for a particular level and type of technologically-provided
privacy and transparency.
The first task will be to map the various harms described in
Part II onto the various quadrants of the matrix. Second, the fo-
cus will shift to a much more dynamic analysis of the matrix,
spending more time than allotted during the descriptive phase
on pairwise comparisons between the quadrants. We know for
example, that the FBI hopes for non-robust privacy protection
(Types I and III) and that privacy advocates hope for robust
technology (Types II and IV); this is the traditional divide, the
one presented by those who see the world as a spectrum, and the
one that I have claimed has led to intractable debates and has
paralyzed policymakers. The great value of the matrix's added
dimension is to broaden from a single-minded focus on robust-
ness and to force people to make comparisons, for example, be-
tween the rows and the corners of the model. For example, as
crypted Data, NY Times C1 (Feb 22, 2008); J. Alex Halderman, et al, Lest We Remember:
Cold Boot Attacks on Encryption Keys, Draft Paper of the Center for Information Technol-
ogy Policy at Princeton University, available at <http://citp.princeton.edu/memory/> (last
visited Apr 4, 2008).
178 Morris, Notes on Vista Forensics cited in note 76) (reporting that BitLocker is
available in Vista Enterprise and Ultimate and EFS is available in the Business, Enter-
prise, and Ultimate editions).
179 Id ("Initially there were some concerns within the computer forensics community
that the proposed encryption features of Vista, especially BitLocker, would result in a
huge increase in the amount of encrypted data confronting examiners. However, it is now
clear that these features will be limited to the higher end editions of Vista only and are
not implemented by default."). EFS is also not enabled by default, but it "simply requires
a checkbox to be ticked in the file or folder's properties to be enabled." Id.
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between different non-robust tools, would the FBI prefer those in
Type I or Type III? Would privacy advocates prefer the robust
tools in Type II or IV?
Third, the discussion will view the matrix no longer as a
static chart but as a playing surface with moving parts. We will
look at the dynamics of the chart, examining what happens, for
example, when laws are introduced that attempt to push tech-
nologies from row to row or column to column. This will help us
critique various classes of reform.
Up until now, we have treated the matrix like an Audubon
guide for classifying privacy technology in the wild. Now, we will
think of it more like the plans for a garden or farm, imagining
the world of technology we want to inhabit, and judging and for-
mulating policies to carry us to that world.
A. Applying Struggle to the Matrix
The harms from too much privacy and transparency de-
scribed in Part II are at their worst with Type IV and Type I
technologies. For example, consider the effects of Type V tools.
Robust privacy-enhancing tools worry the police, but much more
if they are easy-to-use or come installed with computers by de-
fault. If tools like Skype and BitTorrent become widely used, the
anonymity they provide will inspire fears of undetectable crime.
These fears alone could spur law enforcement to seek new search
and seizure laws and may convince judges and legislators that
they deserve them. More police money would be invested in sup-
porting the underground economy of spyware and virus writing.
More indiscriminate monitoring would occur.
Similarly, a world of many Type I technologies would spur
individual and collective harm and would make it difficult to dis-
sent. 8 0 Of course, the same could be said of Type III tools, which
also provide weak privacy. Privacy advocates likely worry more
about Type I than Type III technologies, however, because Type I
tools are more likely to deceive users. Users do not choose Type
III tools because they expect privacy; instead, they choose Type
III tools for the ease-of-use or affordability. Type I technologies,
on the other hand, are costly; paying a Type I tool's costs might
180 Usually, the market will take care of all of these fears by ensuring that Type I
technologies do not arise or spread. But a world full of Type I technology could possibly be
forced through laws and policies like CALEA and Clipper. Privacy advocates thus fear
and oppose such laws with good reason. We will highlight forced Type I moves at the end
of this Part.
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create for the unsophisticated user the illusion of robust privacy.
For example, people who pay the costs of setting up WEP wire-
less security may expect that, in return for their investment,
they should receive privacy and security. These users, laboring
under less privacy than they think they have, may act carelessly,
sharing more information than they would if they had under-
stood the circumstances.
This brief discussion is meant to illuminate the value of the
matrix model and the struggle-enhancing ideals underpinning it.
The matrix focuses attention on the crucial and easy-to-neglect
cost dimension. When focusing on cost as well as robustness,
analysts will start to ask nuanced questions which are unlikely
to elicit entrenched, knee-jerk responses. For example, attention
to the cost dimension would force advocates to think past simple
questions (with obvious answers) about whether "robust or not
robust" privacy-enhancing tools are better; instead, they would
focus on more sophisticated, second-order considerations such as:
what is the effect on dissidents if they have access only to "robust
and high cost" tools without access to "robust and low cost" tools?
The matrix also makes it easier to focus on more than one
tool at a time, discouraging analysts from focusing too narrowly
on one technology. Just the spatial, visual image of the two-
dimensional matrix itself reminds observers that there is an en-
tire landscape dotted with tools that impact privacy and trans-
parency. Participants who adopt this type of landscape view-
instead of a narrower, one-tool-at-a-time view--can better weigh
benefits and costs collectively. It may not matter if this Type III
tool is insufficiently robust, the matrix model may lead us to con-
clude, because it is balanced by so many robust Type II tools. In
contrast, when analysts focus on the spectrum, it is easier for
them to obsess about one tool, imagining slippery slopes, turning
the debate over a single technology into the battlefield where the
war is won or lost.
The matrix and the struggle-enhancing view lead directly to
compromise. The matrix helps participants understand the great
variety of choices which may provide more room for leeway and
negotiation. Unlike the spectrum, where every battle is zero-
sum, with the matrix, losses along one axis may be offset by
gains (or at least held ground) in the other dimension. Thus, the
FBI agent can console himself by recognizing that although some
developer has introduced a new, robust technology, it is hard to
use; likewise, the EFF attorney can take solace in the fact that
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the not-terribly-robust tool at least comes bundled with every
version of Windows.
B. Good Enough Privacy-Hard but Possible
1. Hard but possible.
If Type I and IV technologies would raise the most signifi-
cant and important risks of harm, then they should be avoided. If
we could avoid these, we would find ourselves in a world of Type
II and Type III tools. I call this a "hard but possible" world, and I
will argue that it best avoids the harms discussed in Part II. It is
the world of technology we should strive to create.
How are privacy and transparency allocated to different
people in a world with only Type II and III technologies? First,
because of the existence of Type II tools, those with sufficient
resources who desire privacy can have it. s l Everybody else
would have to resign themselves to Type III tools, either because
they would not care as much about privacy or because they could
not afford privacy's costs.
Meanwhile, the police would find this world to be, perhaps
reassuringly, much like today's world. Some criminals (and dis-
sidents) would be very difficult to monitor, because of their use of
robust tools. But because these robust tools, by definition, would
be limited to those with resources, many people, perhaps the ma-
jority, would use Type III instead. Because Type III tools can be
easily pierced, the police would enjoy a steady stream of success-
ful investigations.
I call this mix of privacy and transparency, "hard but possi-
ble," because actors can get what they want, but only with hard
work. Speakers who want to speak privately--criminals, dissi-
181 Because fewer people will use encryption in a "hard but possible" world, those who
use encryption may find themselves the target of increased government attention. Using
techniques known as traffic-analysis, those conducting surveillance can tell that a par-
ticular user is using encryption, even if they cannot decipher the communications. See
Richard A. Posner, Privacy Surveillance, and Law, 75 U Chi L Rev 245, 253 (2008) ("Traf-
fic analysis is examining message length, frequency, and time of communication and
other noncontent information that may reveal suspicious patterns; thus traffic analysis
cannot be foiled by encryption because the information is not content based."); David A.
Walker, Privacy in the Digital Age: Encryption Policy-A Call for Congressional Action,
1999 Stan Tech L Rev 3, 23 ("In a world where encryption is the exception rather than
the rule, it is much easier to determine who has something to hide as the encrypted, and
presumably most interesting or highest value, messages stand out. If the time comes
when most message traffic is encrypted, it will be impossible to determine which are the
most secret messages in real time and the sheer volume of encrypted message traffic will
make traffic analysis difficult.").
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dents, and the merely paranoid-should be able to, provided they
have the resources. The police would find it very difficult to catch
the most resourceful, sophisticated speakers online, but as the
earlier discussion of the Timberline High case demonstrates,
even those speakers would be detectable with an investment of
time, tools, and manpower.
2. How hard but possible reduces harm.
The hard but possible world's distribution of power and tools
represents the best formula for minimizing privacy's and trans-
parency's harms. So long as some suspected criminals use Type
III tools-which should be plentiful given the lack of low-cost
Type IV alternatives-the police would be able to track them.
These successes, in turn, would give the police and their champi-
ons confidence in their continued ability to fight crime despite
the spread of digital communication. Because of this confidence,
they would be less likely to pursue legislative fixes, gray hat sur-
veillance, and indiscriminate monitoring.
Not only would more arrests and convictions quell desires for
new legal authorities, but when new laws would be sought, they
would be less likely to be embraced by sympathetic legislators
and judges because advocates on the other side would be able to
point to the surveillance the police can still perform.
Likewise, the harms of perfect transparency would also be
reduced because Type II tools would be available in the hard but
possible world. People who manage to find, install, and properly
use these technologies would enjoy robust privacy and everything
it provides. They would be able to develop themselves through
self-realization and would find a sense of repose. They would en-
joy increased dignity and autonomy. All of society may benefit, as
people would use Type II-bestowed privacy to fuel the debate
over hard choices. Most specifically, if freedom fighters used
Type II tools, they would be able to organize and agitate.
This is a very rosy picture of the hard but possible world.
Unfortunately, the discussion masks one potentially ugly result
of the world described. This result is clear when one examines
who would get the benefits of privacy in this world.
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3. Distributional concerns.
The crucial difference between a world full of Type II tech-
nologies and one with Type IV technologies is the fate of the un-
sophisticated criminal (or dissident).18 2 In either world, ex-
tremely savvy (or wealthy) criminals would find technological
privacy. But in the Type IV-rich world, the unsophisticated
criminal would be able to hide while in the Type II-dominated
world he would not. 183
This disparity stems from a feature of Type IV tools: they
protect users from surveillance, whether or not they ask to be
protected. Every Skype user benefits from encryption, even if he
does not care if his conversations could potentially be monitored.
Every BitLocker user and almost every BitTorrent user will simi-
larly receive more protection than he asks for or realizes he en-
joys.
But if we did not have Type IV tools, if we lived in a hard-
but-possible world, it would be the unsophisticated, the poor, and
the powerless who suffer. They would be the bone thrown to the
police to tamp down desires to engage in gray hat surveillance
and enact new laws. In other words, "hard but possible" may be
seen as the desire to give privacy only to the powerful and
wealthy.
I worry about the distributional problem, but ultimately I
resist the critique for many reasons. First, the "costs" in the ma-
trix are not tied exclusively to traditional resources such as
money or labor. The most important resource needed is techno-
logical know-how. A good hacker can download and install TOR
with relative ease and for free. Furthermore, in a world where
Moore's law is driving down the cost of computers; with Internet
access more widespread than ever; and with an entire universe of
182 Regulating the unsophisticated may have been the motive underlying the Clipper
Chip. Although sophisticated users might have avoided the technology, the unsophisti-
cated would not. As Steven Levy speculated at the time:
The Government understands the impossibility of eradicating strong crypto. Its
objective is instead to prevent unbreakable encryption from becoming routine. If
that happens, even the stupidest criminal would be liberated from the threat of
surveillance. But by making Clipper the standard, the Government is betting
that only a tiny percentage of users would use other encryption or try to defeat
the Clipper.
Steven Levy, Battle of the Clipper Chip, NY Times 6 (June 12, 1994).
183 See Froomkin, 143 U Pa L Rev at 796-97 (cited in note 5) ("Clipper's critics suggest
that it can catch only stupid criminals.... The least subtle response has been that crimi-
nals are often dumber than one thinks.").
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free, and freely available, open source operating systems and
tools, the opportunity to master computers would be available
very far down the socioeconomic stratum. Contrast this with
molecules-not-bits technologies, which often require expensive
tools to master.
Of course, this argument should not be overstated. There are
many, many hurdles that prevent a poor person from becoming a
hacker. Although computers and Internet access are cheaper
than they have been before, they are still expensive to many.
Also, technological mastery requires not only tools but free time,
something that the poor have in short supply. In fact, wealthy
people have an advantage that even the moderately wealthy may
not: without ever mastering the technology, they can simply buy
technological privacy; they would not need to become hackers,
because they could pay other hackers to protect them.
A second response is that while the possibility of distribu-
tional inequality should raise concerns, these concerns likely do
not offset the harms described in Part II. The harms from too
much privacy-of gray hat surveillance, draconian new laws, and
unsolved crime-are profound, and they need to be addressed,
perhaps even if the solution means privacy is handed out accord-
ing to preexisting inequalities. This is especially true if some of
the harms from too much transparency-especially indiscrimi-
nate surveillance and broad new surveillance laws-could be
used disproportionately to disadvantage the same disadvantaged
groups.
This is another way of saying that there are many, many
distributional concerns in our society, and that identifying one
more should raise serious concerns but cannot serve by itself to
indict.
Third, there may be ways to soften distributional inequali-
ties. For example, consider the freedom fighter again. Freedom
fighters, who are often poor, should be empowered by sympa-
thetic, wealthy individuals, organizations, and governments who
support their causes. People should find ways to supply money,
technological know-how, training, computer hardware, and soft-
ware tools directly to oppressed freedom fighters. Consider, for
example, the work of Dr. Patrick Ball, Deputy Director of the
Science and Human Rights Program with the Association for the
Advancement of Science. Through AAAS, Dr. Ball has worked
extensively with "grassroots non-government human rights or-
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ganizations and truth commissions to build information man-
agement systems."'1 4 Much of this work involved helping groups
use tools of privacy and anonymity. 8 5 In many cases, govern-
ments should share this burden. Imagine the Voice of Amer-
ica/Radio Free Europe, but with code. Rather than making pri-
vacy-enhancing software simply easier to use, with the end re-
sult of moving tools from Type II to Type IV, resources could in-
stead be used to help chosen individuals struggle against totali-
tarians.
C. Enforcing Struggle
Finally, having established the value of hard but possible,
good enough privacy, let us conclude this Article by looking at
prescriptions that push the world in this direction. According to
Professor Lawrence Lessig, four forces regulate online behavior:
markets, norms, code, and law. 86 These forces have each played
a role in the evolution of privacy and transparency, albeit often
through unintentional decisions and without a systematic vision
of technological privacy and technology.
How can these four online regulators be used to push the
world away from Type I and Type IV and into Type II and Type
III tools? Consider them in turn.
1. Markets.
Markets already seem to select against Type I and IV tech-
nologies. Both types are rarely seen and hard to come by. The
examples presented in this Article-WEP (Type I), Skype, Bit-
Torrent, and BitLocker/EFS (all Type TV)-are exceptions.
Perhaps markets do not produce many Type TV tools because
people undervalue information privacy. This is an empirical, not
normative, claim. Especially because measures to secure privacy
are expensive, and because the harms from invasions of privacy
are often diffuse, market forces do not push software developers
to invest heavily in protecting privacy.
BitLocker/EFS, Skype, and BitTorrent are exceptions. These
are all recent examples, and perhaps they mark a shift in the
market, reflecting more consumer price sensitivity to privacy.
184 Affidavit of Patrick Ball, ACLU v Miller, available at <http://www.aclu.org/privacy/
speech/15525lgl20031OO9.html> (last visited Apr 4, 2008).
185 Id.
186 Lawrence Lessig, Code Version 2.0 123-25 (Basic 2006).
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BitLocker/EFS, in particular, seems to support this theory. In
2002, Microsoft very publicly shifted resources and attention to
improving the security of its code. 187 Microsoft's executives con-
cluded that the constant barrage of vulnerabilities in the Win-
dows Operating System, in particular, was beginning to wear on
customers who were increasingly aware of identity theft' 88 For
example, it was widely reported around that time that as many
as five thousand employees were pulled off assignments for
months to attend security refresher courses. 189
But it is difficult to tell whether Microsoft's newfound sensi-
tivity to privacy and security represents a shift in the market or
whether it instead is specific to this company. In fact, there is
even some doubt whether Microsoft will continue to invest so
heavily in security. The company may be chastened by the many
reviewers who have complained about the overbearing security
measures in Windows Vista. 190
In contrast to the story at Microsoft, Skype and BitTorrent
more likely reflect outliers, products of other pressures and not
part of a trend to more Type IV encryption. Some BitTorrent
programmers added encryption to protect a particular kind of
privacy-privacy against ISPs.191 ISPs have begun slowing down
the speed of their networks for users who have been trading
many large files using BitTorrent. 192 Developers changed ver-
sions of the BitTorrent client in response, converting them from
187 Kevin Maney, Microsoft Shifts Its Focus to Security, USA Today 1B (Jan 17, 2002)
(reporting memo from Bill Gates to Microsoft focus announcing a shift of priorities to
focus more on security).
188 Id.
189 Peter Judge, MS Spends $100M on Security Tutorials, ZDNet News.com (July 2,
2002), available at <http://news.zdnet.com/2100-3513_22-941159.html> (last visited Apr
4, 2008).
190 Mike Masnick, Did Microsoft Focus Too Much on Security in Vista?, Techdirt Blog
(Nov 29, 2007), available at <http://www.techdirt.comlarticles/20071127/022730.shtml>
(last visited Apr 4, 2008) ("It turns out that, while security is important to users, it's not
so important that it comes at the expense of other things-like stability and compatibil-
ity. In other words, while focusing on security, Microsoft may have dropped the ball on
other features that actually are more important in the buying and upgrading decisions.")
(emphasis in original).
191 Ernesto, How to Encrypt BitTorrent Traffic, TorrentFreak Blog (Apr 16, 2006),
available at <http://torrentfreak.com/how-to-encrypt-bittorrent-traffic> (last visited Apr
4, 2008) (noting that encryption was being added to BitTorrent clients to take out ISP
"traffic shapers").
192 Peter Svensson, Comcast Blocks Some Internet Traffic, AP (Aug 19, 2007), avail-
able at <http://rss.msnbc.msn.com/id121376597/> (last visited Jan 30, 2008) ("Comcast
Corp. actively interferes with attempts by some of its high-speed Internet subscribers to
share files online.").
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Type III to Type IV tools to protect a narrow type of privacy
against a narrow type of monitoring.
Skype's path to Type IV status is no less idiosyncratic. Skype
is a peer-to-peer service. Phone calls are sent efficiently over the
Internet by enlisting other Skype "peers"-other computers run-
ning Skype-to help carry the traffic along. Early on, it was un-
derstood that malicious peers might be able to listen in to third-
party phone calls. Thus, encryption was seen as necessary to
convince users to trust the network. 193
Although all three of these stories are examples of develop-
ers improving the privacy of their programs, they do not seem to
suggest a great awakening on the part of consumers to informa-
tion privacy concerns they have neglected for years. Instead, they
seem like three special cases that do not necessarily signify a
trend.
2. Norms.
Legal scholars have not discussed the norms of technological
secrecy and privacy. We know that most people tend not to
bother using encryption at all, aside from the built-in, Type II,
encryption that comes bundled with our web browser. 194
There is some interesting and useful work in computer sci-
ence that deserves to be imported. For example, researchers at
Princeton led by Shirley Gaw interviewed the activist-employees
of a "non-violent direct action organization."'195 In the words of
the study's authors, these employees "had opponents working
against them, they had secrets to protect, and colleagues' free-
dom was at stake when security failed."'196 In short, these were
people one would expect would use encryption.
What the researchers learned instead was that only a few of
their interviewees used encryption, and even those people lim-
ited their use to certain situations. In particular, employees who
193 Templeton, Is Strong Crypto Worse (cited in note 20) ("Skype's architecture rou-
tinely routes voice traffic through other Skype users with real IP addresses in order to get
past NATs. Had they not encrypted, nasty users running these supernodes would be
routinely listening in on the calls going through them.").
194 See Freier, Karlton and Kocher, The SSL Protocol (cited in note 73) (describing
SSL).
195 Shirley Gaw, Edward W. Felten, and Patricia Fernandez-Kelly, Secrecy, Flagging,
and Paranoia: Adoption Criteria in Encrypted E-Mail, Proceedings of CHI 2006 Confer-
ence on Human Factors in Computing Systems 1 (April 22-27, 2006), available at
<http://www.cs.princeton.edu/-sgaw/publications/0lFeb-Activists-sgaw-CHI2006.pdf>
(last visited Apr 4, 2008).
196 Id.
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handled the logistics of the group's "actions"-defined as "the
high-profile events staged by activists"197-and who tracked do-
nors and donations encrypted email messages. 198 Even those em-
ployees limited the use of encryption to secret information. 199
How does this research answer the question presented in
this Part-can norms be used to push away from Type I and IV
technologies? To answer this, we first need to do some transla-
tion to offset an implicit bias in the work. These researchers-
like most computer scientists who research encryption-start
from the assumption that encrypted email deserves to be "uni-
versal and routine."200 Perhaps because of this starting point,
their conclusions and prescriptions tended to revolve around how
tools could be made more usable to make encryption more com-
mon.20 1 In other words, they concluded that the norms have
failed to push software to Type IV-where they "deserved" to
be-and recommended efforts to bring about more Type IV tools
as a remedy.
But when one steps back from this bias, one can see that
norms more directly regulate behavior in a world of Type II and
III technologies than in a world of Type IV technologies. For ex-
ample, many employees seemed to see the use of encryption as a
signal or flag of the secrecy of a message. One employee ex-
pressed his annoyance, for example, at a co-worker who en-
crypted mundane messages. 20 2 This signaling feature would be
lost if the organization switched to a Type IV, effortless encryp-
tion method.
Other employees elaborated on this role of encryption as a
"flagging" mechanism. An employee discussed how there were
norms of politeness bound up in encryption: if a message was
sent encrypted, it was expected that replies would also be en-
crypted.
Finally, several employees saw the use of technological pri-
vacy as paranoid and not for "normal people. '203 It was also seen
197 Id at 3 n 2.
198 Id at 6.
199 Gaw, Felten, and Fernandez-Kelly, Secrecy, Flagging, and Paranoia at 4 (cited in
note 195) (discussing employees with pseudonyms Woodward and Abe).
200 Id at 1.
201 Id at 8-9.
202 Id at 7 (quoting "Abe," "I get this message and--oooh, it's encrypted. 'Can we have
a meeting tomorrow at 2:00?' I'm like, what's the secret?").
203 Gaw, Felten, and Ferndandez-Kelly, Secrecy, Flagging, and Paranoia at 7 (cited in
note 195).
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as something for techies, something with a high "gadget fac-
tor."20 4 In sum, norms have pushed the use of encryption in this
organization into a hard but possible mix. Encryption is hard to
use but robust, and norms of politeness and respect for hierarchy
cause important messages-those involving the group's actions
and donors-to be encrypted, while the rest are not.
One concern with incorporating this research into the matrix
is the confounded causes and effects. Many of the conclusions of
the paper stem from the fact that the encryption tool used by the
organization was difficult to use.20 5 If the organization instead
had access to Type IV technology, perhaps the norms would have
been very different. Technology shapes norms just as much as
norms dictate technology. Because of this complex relationship,
there are limits to what can be concluded from these observa-
tions about norms and the technology of privacy and transpar-
ency. More work should be done in determining how this Article's
prescriptions relate to past, present, and evolving norms.
3. Code.
Most of all, it is hoped that software developers appreciate
better the complex and potentially fraught world of too much pri-
vacy. When these developers see privacy as an irreproachable
good, their conscious and unconscious choices will lead to more
robustness and easier-to-use solutions. This may push their tools
into Type IV.
Computer scientists, for example, talk about the "grand chal-
lenge" of providing secure email. 206 Although these researchers
are focused, in large part, on the complexity of getting the vari-
ous forms of encryption to work, 20 7 it is evident that much of the
challenge comes from making secure email easy to use. 20 8 Re-
searchers engaged in the grand challenge never seem to stop to
discuss whether easy-to-use secure email is desirable. 20 9 The con-
204 Id at 4 (quoting Abe).
205 Id at 8 ("Critics may argue that ActivistCorp had adopted the least usable form of
the technology. Had employees adopted implementations like HushMail, CryptoHeaven,
or S/MIME support in e-mail clients like Thunderbird or Outlook, perhaps they would
have encrypted more frequently or with fewer complaints.').
206 Garfinkel, Thesis: Design Principles and Patterns at 161 (cited in note 156).
207 Id (describing the difficulty of the challenge as being that it "requires that many
other problems be solved first.').
208 Id at 168 (critiquing the "usability" of a commonly used secure email protocol
called SIMTME).
209 Shirley Gaw, for example, in the first line of her interesting paper on the norms of
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clusion is assumed, and it would probably seem ridiculous to
them to suggest otherwise.
Developers implementing encryption should consider
whether "ease of use" is always the best option. For example,
consider software defaults. Studies show that privacy-enhancing
software that is shipped "turned off" by default is very likely to
remain off. As a result, software defaults can make an otherwise
Type IV technology act like a Type III tool instead. For this rea-
son, Microsoft's decisions to disable BitLocker by default and to
keep BitLocker and EFS out of "home" versions of their Vista
operating system are significant. 210
This advice applies not only to developers. Privacy advocates
investing in privacy-enhancing technologies should consider in-
vesting more in projects that improve tool robustness and less in
projects designed to make software easier to use. Groups moti-
vated by the concern that dissidents need encryption to speak
freely should consider investing in training dissidents, rather
than making a tool so easy to use that anybody-dissident,
criminal, and ordinary user alike-will be able to take advan-
tage.
4. Law.
Almost every past attempt by the U.S. government to regu-
late encryption has suffered from the same fatal flaw: each time
it has tried to force tools to be Type I. For all of the reasons de-
scribed in this Article, it is a disaster to force Type I tools on peo-
ple by regulation. Type I tools raise starkly the harms of too
much transparency. Privacy advocates and computer scientists
understand this, which explains their fierce opposition to past
proposals.
Clipper tried to push onto an unwilling market an encryp-
tion scheme that was completely transparent to government offi-
cials holding escrowed keys. 211 CALEA forces providers to engi-
neer systems to allow quick, easy access to communications by
government agents.
encrypted e-mail starts with the question, "What will it take to make the use of encrypted
e-mail universal and routine? ' Gaw, Felten, and Fernandez-Kelly, Secrecy, Flagging, and
Paranoia at 1 (cited in note 195). She never pauses to ask the question, "Is universal and
routine encrypted e-mail desirable?"
210 Morris, Notes on Vista Forensics (cited in note 76).
211 See Froomkin, 143 U Pa L Rev at 741 (cited in note 5) ("[B]reaking through Clip-
per's protections will involve no (computational) effort for authorized persons because the
government will keep a copy of the keys.").
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In both cases, the government has repeatedly argued that
the opposition's concerns about too much transparency were
overblown not because they were untrue, but because the gov-
ernment promised to use organizational and bureaucratic con-
trols to replace the dissolved technological barriers. Thus, Clip-
per's escrowed keys would be split in two pieces and handed to
different executive branch agencies. 212 Likewise, CALEA gives
the police no affirmative authority to monitor, it just smoothes
the way for an agent with a warrant or court order to access
communications quickly.
These responses are not untrue. With CALEA and Clipper,
the government did impose bureaucratic and legal controls. But
these types of controls can be repealed or modified, 213 and for
that reason, they are almost besides the point in the discussion
over technological privacy and transparency. This is why organ-
izational and bureaucratic constraints do not appear in the ma-
trix model presented above. These types of constraints are valu-
able, and should be debated and scrutinized, but they are a non
sequitur when it comes to measuring the potential harms de-
scribed in Part II.
A better CALEA would have been one that tried to engineer
struggle instead of perfect transparency. Perhaps CALEA could
have been written to limit the key length on provider supplied
encryption, allowing the police the chance to crack communica-
tions through brute force computational methods, but only at
great cost; this would have made decryption hard but possible.
Or perhaps CALEA could have targeted the spread and ease of
use of privacy-enhancing technology, rather than the robustness.
It could have, for example, prevented providers from supplying
privacy-enhancing tools like encryption to users by default. Us-
ers could opt-in to encryption, but the ordinary user probably
would not.
There is an important, more general point. The government
has repeatedly tried, and will no doubt in the future try again, to
impose vulnerabilities in encryption. Each time it has done this,
it has tried to swing for the fences-to force people to move all
the way from perfect privacy to perfect transparency. Next time,
212 The designated agencies were the Department of Commerce's NIST and the Treas-
ury Department's Automated Systems Division. Id at 759 & n 204 (citing US Department
of Justice, Press Release, Attorney General Makes Key Escrow Encryption Announcements
(Feb 4, 1994), available at <http://www.cpsr.orglprevsite/programlclipper/reno-key-
escrow-announcement.html> (last visited Apr 4, 2008).
213 See Froomkin, 143 U Pa L Rev at 782-86 (cited in note 5).
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perhaps it should try to hit a single instead, trying to mandate
weaker, but not weak, encryption. These more modest goals do
less to bring about the harms described in Part II.
But how would the government weaken without crippling
encryption? One obvious way would be to regulate key length,
but there would be limits to this approach. With most crypto-
graphic systems, brute force decryption can be sped up by using
computers in parallel. 214 Roughly speaking, four computers can
decrypt four times more quickly than one computer. Thus, what
may seem impenetrable to the typical observer may turn out to
be surmountable for the government agency with ample re-
sources.
But there are better alternatives to regulating key length,
found in some interesting cryptographic research. In a sense,
these implement hard-but-possible through technology. For ex-
ample, Ron Rivest, the noted cryptographer who co-invented the
RSA public key cryptography system has discussed what he calls
timed-release cryptography. 215 These are encryption methods
that can be broken through brute force methods, but that are
guaranteed to require a set period of time to crack. In other
words, these are methods designed to thwart the use of parallel
computers. Without getting into all of the details, these methods
are designed to force would-be decrypters to attack the problem
one step at a time, which would prevent them from using more
computers to solve the problem in less time. In Ronald Rivest's
words, these techniques are "intrinsically sequential. '216
214 Ronald L. Rivest, Adi Shamir, and David A. Wagner, Time-Lock Puzzles and
Timed-Release Crypto (1996) available at <http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu87499.html> (last
visited Apr 4, 2008).
215 Aldar C-F. Chan and Ian F. Blake, Scalable, Server-Passive, User-Anonymous
Timed Release Cryptography, Proceedings of the 25th IEEE International Conference on
Distributed Computing Systems 504-13 (2005); Rivest, Shamir, and Wagner, Time-Lock
Puzzles (cited in note 214).
216 Ronald L. Rivest, Description of the LCS35 Time Capsule Crypto-Puzzle (Apr 4,
1999), available at <http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/lcs35-puzzle-description.txt> (last
visited Apr 4, 2008). In 1999, in honor of the 35th anniversary of MIT's Laboratory for
Computing Science, Ronald Rivest encrypted a message using a timed-release crypto
method and presented the ciphertext to Frank Gehry, who was designing LCS's new
building. At the time, Professor Rivest explained, "We estimate that the puzzle will re-
quire 35 years of continuous computation to solve, with the computer being replaced
every year by the next fastest model available. Most of the work will really be done in the
last few years, however." Id.
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Another possibility is known as translucent cryptography. 217
Building on some earlier work by others, in the middle of the
Clipper debate, Rivest again (writing with others) proposed an
encryption scheme that would yield to keys held by the govern-
ment, but only some of the time, creating probabilistic surveil-
lance. For example, if the "p" value of the translucent cryptogra-
phy was tuned to a value of 0.02, the police with access to cipher-
text and the proper key would be able to crack the encryption in
2 percent of the cases.
This is "hard but possible" in action. If a CALEA-like law or
a Clipper-like quid pro quo scheme tried to force users to use
timed-release or translucent cryptography instead of force per-
fect transparency, it would shift the balance between speakers
and surveillers, but without shifting all the way to perfection.
Not only would this approach ameliorate the harms of too much
transparency, it would perhaps encounter less fierce opposition.
Both of these solutions arose even though the market tended to
discourage hard-but-possible thinking in cryptography. Imagine
the even more revolutionary proposals that might arise if the
NSF decides to fund such a project.
I do not want to be overly sanguine about the public's likely
embrace of compelled use of any of these techniques. The average
cypherpunk will see little difference between Clipper's and
CALEA's perfect transparency and these hard but possible tech-
niques. In fact, it is the compulsion-the inability to choose-
that offends. Yet I do hold out hope that such critics would in-
stead see hard but possible as a more moderate position, one that
would preserve-through code-a level playing field. Even if
these particular schemes were insufficiently "hard," perhaps
there would be others, extant or that would be invented, that
would satisfy.
CONCLUSION
This Article has tried to bridge a divide which causes pro-
privacy and pro-transparency advocates to shout past one an-
other. On the pro-privacy side, I am including a fairly well-
defined group: privacy advocates at EFF, the Electronic Privacy
Information Center, and the Center for Democracy and Technol-
217 Consider Mihir Bellare and Ronald Rivest, Translucent Cryptography: An Alterna-
tive to Key Escrow, and Its Implementation via Fractional Oblivious Transfer, 12 J Cryp-
tology (Oct 1999).
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ogy; and the legal scholars who have been recently twice-branded
as the "New Privacy" scholars 218 and as members of the "Infor-
mation Privacy Law Project. ' 219 These participants view infor-
mation privacy as a fundamental right, and in fact place infor-
mation privacy on a privileged deontological plane, focusing not
only on traditional conceptions of individual rights, but recasting
the interest as societal, focusing on privacy's role in securing in-
dividual autonomy, dignity, and deliberative democracy that flow
from the exploitation of personal information.
Opposed to these participants is an eclectic group of people,
more different than alike but tied together by a focus on tradi-
tional utilitarian balancing tests and market-based conceptions
of privacy. These participants range from law enforcement offi-
cials, to privacy-as-property market-driven libertarians, to Inter-
net-Fourth Amendment scholars, to communitarians, to national
security hawks.
These two sides are not engaging one another, but this does
not seem to be a matter of benign neglect; the two sides seem
simply unconvinced by one another's arguments. Granted, each
side will often pay lip service to the other, being careful always to
extol the virtues of the values described by the other side. "Pri-
vacy is indeed important," says the scholar about to urge for less
of it. "The need to protect our security is unquestionable," re-
sponds her colleague, just before questioning it. One suspects,
however, that neither side truly believes the other side's claims.
There is an air of cordiality that needs to be stripped away, mak-
ing the choices more starkly presented.
This polite, disengaged rhetoric troubles those of us who be-
lieve the claims made by both sides. Security is an important
goal, and given the fear-rational or not-we feel about terror-
ism, we hope the government can think of new ways to defend us
from future attacks, and we are probably willing to give up some
privacy for greater security. But we also credit the New Privacy
scholar's descriptive and normative claims about privacy, valuing
our privacy deeply and believing claims about the importance of
privacy for self-determination, autonomy, and deliberative de-
mocracy. Furthermore, we are chastened by the lessons of his-
tory: balancing away such interests in the face of some security
218 Paul M. Schwartz and William M. Treanor, The New Privacy, 101 Mich L Rev
2163, 2177 n 33 and accompanying text (2003).
219 Neil M. Richards, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94 Geo L J 1087, 1089 n 6
(2006).
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threat has proven too easy to do, and one wonders whether we
can change the terms of the debate to better respect the values of
privacy.
The problem with balancing two equally important and
seemingly unmoving interests is that anytime one side prevails
on any narrow set of facts, the other side-engaged as it were in
a game of brinksmanship-views the result as a loss. This is the
"Thunderdome" approach to balancing, a zero-sum endeavor
where two opposing principles enter, and only one can emerge
victorious.
The solution--or better yet, one solution-is struggle. Al-
though it is a small change, a tweak, on one's perspective, it may
pay great dividends. By redefining the debate about something
other than balance, by defining a new normative value-hard but
possible communication and investigation, and by identifying a
mechanism-struggle-for realizing that value, this Article has
offered an alternative vocabulary for discussing the virtues of
both privacy and transparency.
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